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This thesis addresses the topic of German espionage in 
the United States between 1935 and 1945. It examines what 
the expectations were for Germany's spies in America, their 
activities, and the success or failure of their operations. 
In addition, the reaction of the American public to these 
spies is also studied, as well as the response to what was 
perceived as a threat to the United States from Nazi 
Germany. 
Research on this subject reveals that there were a 
number of German espionage agents involved in several 
different spy rings operating in the United States before 
Pearl Harbor. Information obtained by these individuals 
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primarily concerned the transportation of war materials to 
the Allies, and America's industrial and military 
production. Much of the information sent to Germany was not 
of a highly classified nature and could be found in 
technical journals and publications, through verbal 
affirmation and visual sightings. Most of these individuals 
were arrested in the summer of 1941. 
During the war years, German military intelligence 
attempted two separate missions involving three different 
landings of agents from submarines on America's Atlantic 
shores. All of these agents, a total of ten, were caught by 
the FBI before any spying or act of sabotage could be 
accomplished. 
The available information and source data reveals that 
German espionage operations in America were replete with 
mistakes, bad organization, involved poor agent selection, 
and ultimately fulfilled few of the expectations of the 
Third Reich's spymasters. However, the beliefs held by many 
Americans concerning German spies and their operations, 
contradict what is seen now as the overall failure of German 
spying in the United States. This was due in part to the 
media--newspapers, magazines, nonfiction books, popular 
fiction, and Hollywood movies--which exaggerated and 
sensationalized the danger presented by Nazi espionage 
agents in America. For much of America, the media 
reinforced an image of the insidious but resourceful Nazi 
spy, and suggested accomplishments far exceeding their 
actual performance and success. Thus there was a great 
difference between what many American's believed, and the 
true achievements of German agents and their operations in 
the United States. 
Primary sources valuable in the production of this 
paper include the volumes of Documents on German Foreign 
Policy, statements pertaining to individual agents, spy 
rings and sabotage operations furnished by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, and the vast microfilm collection 
of German records seized following the end of World War II 
held by the National Archives. Also used were personal 
memoirs, information compiled and released by the U.S. 
Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence, the volumes of The 
Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International 
Military Tribunal, and the 1938-1945 volumes of Foreign 
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers. 
Important secondary sources include what proved to be 
the invaluable contemporary works written between 1935 and 
1945 about the German espionage menace in America. These 
included not only nonfiction books, but magazine articles 
and news items from the New York Times. Also very useful 
were Heinz Hohne's excellent biography of Wilhelm Canaris, 
David Kahn's well-researched book on German military 
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intelligence in World War II, and Ladislas Farago's The 
Game of Foxes. 
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Following World War I, the United States emerged as 
one of the great powers of the world. America's assistance 
to the Allies exemplified its capability in war. It also 
revealed the strength of the country's industrial capacity, 
which was certain to give it a decisive edge in future 
conflicts. Military intelligence operations--the gathering 
of sensitive information concerning the condition, 
resources, and plans of other countries--had long played a 
crucial role in the victory or defeat of nations. Because 
of its increased status and developed power, post-World War 
I America tempted many as a lucrative espionage target, 
particularly the military intelligence agents of Germany. 
Germany was at the end of the power scale from the 
United States. Having lost the war in 1918, it was at the 
mercy of what many Germans viewed as an extremely punitive 
peace treaty engineered by the victors. The Treaty of 
Versailles assigned Germany responsibility for the war, and 
for all the civilian losses and damage suffered by the 
victorious Allies. According to terms of the Treaty, 
Germany was to make monetary compensation for all the damage 
it had done, and was also required to forfeit to the Allies, 
large amounts of goods, including steel, coal, and timber. 
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Its army and navy were limited to no more than token forces. 
The military air force was eliminated entirely. The 
manufacture of most offensive military weapons and equipment 
was forbidden. The Allies had refused to negotiate a peace 
settlement with the German military or the monarchy, except 
to demand unconditional surrender if these forces were not 
removed from power. In Germany, war-weary citizens 
demonstrated, demanding peace. Revolution erupted, 
culminating in the Kaiser's abdication and the declaration 
of a German Republic by the majority Socialist party. The 
German people had little experience or understanding of this 
democratic form of government, and most of the country's 
citizens disliked and distrusted the new Republic. Quite on 
purpose, Germany was reduced in power and authority by the 
Treaty and the victorious Allies. 
This enforced reduction in status was difficult for 
many Germans to accept. The country's military leaders were 
particularly indignant. They formulated plans to evade the 
disarmament terms of the Versailles Treaty by secretly 
rearming and rebuilding Germany's military forces. 
Inevitably these plans led Germany's military intelligence 
organization to the United States. There its agents worked 
to gather information, designs, and samples to aid 
clandestine rearmament and buildup of the then illegal 
German air force. 
By 1933, the National Socialists were in power in 
Germany and the fiction of disarmament was cast aside. In 
1935, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris was appointed head of 
Germany's military espionage and counterespionage 
organization--the "Amt Ausland/Abwehr"--and found a small 
cadre of agents already employed in the United States on 
behalf of the Abwehr. Ten years later, the Abwehr was 
essentially absorbed into the 
"Reichssicherheitshauptamt"--the Central State Security 
Bureau of the Nazi Party--or RSHA. Between Canaris' 
appointment and the fall of the Third Reich in 1945, German 
intelligence infiltrated the United States with additional 
agents and landed saboteurs on America's Atlantic shores. 
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The effectiveness of these agents fluctuated widely 
between success and failure. But, irrespective of concrete 
results, Germany's intelligence agents and their espionage 
activities in the United States had a significant effect on 
America and its citizens. Public response to the specter of 
enemy agents was rarely dependent on what their work in 
America had actually produced. Instead, the reaction of 
many Americans was dictated by what they believed was the 
purpose and intention of Nazi spies in the United States. 
These beliefs, encouraged by the federal government, and 
enlarged on by the media, translated into an almost 
irrational fear of covert activities fostered by the "evil" 
Third Reich. 
Consequently, there emerge two important questions 
regarding German espionage activities in the United States 
between 1935 and 1945. First, what did the intelligence 
agencies of Germany--the Abwehr and the RSHA--expect from 
their agents in the United States, and what was ultimately 
accomplished by these agents? Second, were the fears of 
Americans about German spies in the United States and the 
results produced by these spies contradictory? It may be, 
in the final analysis, that the effectiveness of Germany's 
espionage agents and the overall success or failure of 
German intelligence in the United States was of less 
consequence than what Americans believed. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE AMT/AUSLAND ABWEHR 
The German military intelligence system, which had 
operated since the days of Frederick the Great, was 
dismantled after Germany's defeat in World War I. However, 
it was almost immediately resurrected. The purpose of this 
intelligence service was ostensibly to combat leftist 
extremism and revolution within the new and unsteady Weimar 
Republic, and to counter attempts of foreign interference in 
German governmental operations. The clandestine aim of this 
revived intelligence group was to aid Germany in 
circumventing portions of the Versailles Treaty restricting 
foreign intelligence operations. The title of the new 
intelligence and reconnaissance service was "Abwehr" from 
the verb "abwehren," which means literally "to ward off or 
defend," a designation intended to camouflage the real 
purpose of the Abwehr--to spy for Germany. 
Captain Wilhelm Canaris became the head of the Abwehr 
on January 1, 1935. Canaris was forty-eight years old when 
he took over the Abwehr. A career navy man, he entered the 
Imperial Naval Academy in 1905. He served on the light 
cruiser "Dresden" in World War I, until the ship was 
scuttled near Chile in 1915. Canaris first became involved 
in intelligence work in 1916, operating in Spain as an 
6 
espionage director, choosing agents for assignments. He 
supported right-wing elements in the 1920's, and had no real 
loyalty to republicanism and the Weimar Republic. Canaris 
alternated duty on land and sea, rising to command the 
battleship "Schlesien" in 1932. However, in late 1934, 
Canaris received the dead-end appointment as commander of 
the naval station at Swinemlinde, where he was supposed to 
serve out his days until retirement. (1) 
It was Conrad Patzig, appointed head of the Abwehr in 
1932, who recommended Canaris as his replacement. Patzig 
was fired, primarily because of his differences with 
Reinhard Heydrich, Heinrich Himmler, and the Nazi Party's 
security agency, which tended to encroach on spheres of 
operation assigned to the Abwehr. Patzig suggested Canaris' 
name to Admiral Raeder, and Raeder nominated him for the 
position in late 1934. Canaris was thought to be capable of 
handling the antagonism of the rival intelligence 
organization of the Nazi Party, the "Sicherheitsdienst des 
Reichsfilhrers-SS," or SD, under Reinhard Heydrich. 
Heydrich, a former naval officer, had served under Canaris 
when both men had been assigned duty on the cruiser 
"Berlin," and the two men maintained an outwardly friendly 
relationship until Heydrich's death in 1943. Heydrich was 
interested in expanding his own power base and wanted all 
intelligence services in the Third Reich to be put under his 
command. His SD was primarily concerned with political 
espionage and internal security, while the Abwehr was 
7 
responsible for military intelligence and counterespionage. 
However, divisions between the two were often unclear, and 
competition and duplication were inevitable. The SD 
consistently attempted to interfere with the Abwehr's area 
of control, but Canaris was able to hold off Heydrich, and 
for a time maintained the Abwehr as an independent agency of 
the military outside the Party's jurisdiction. 
Following his appointment as chief of the Abwehr, 
Canaris restructured and enlarged the agency. By 1939, what 
had been a six-department organization when Canaris took 
over in 1935 had been consolidated and centralized into 
three major operational groups; espionage, sabotage and 
counterespionage. In addition, the organization included a 
foreign information division and a central branch. Known 
collectively as the "Amt/Ausland Abwehr," by October, 1939, 
Canaris' intelligence service was the military's central 
agency for espionage, sabotage, and counterespionage, with 
all the powers of a full department of the "Oberkommando der 
Wehrmacht"--Armed Forces High Command--or OKW. (2) 
As the Abwehr grew, Canaris found it increasingly 
difficult to supervise his intelligence organization. He 
was not interested in the bureaucratic paperwork necessary 
to run the Abwehr, and it was hard for him to delegate 
responsibility.(3) He preferred visiting the Abwehr field 
stations, where he could feel a part of the actual 
intelligence operations. To the consternation of his field 
commanders, he often issued instructions contradicting their 
basic policies, almost assuring chaotic upheaval at each of 
his visits. (4) 
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Canaris eagerly and personally sought new recruits for 
the Abwehr, often choosing them for their availability 
rather than their talent for intelligence work. His 
personal choices included military men, civilians, 
monarchists, vehement anti-Nazis, and avowed National 
Socialists. Many of Canaris' new recruits lacked the 
necessary experience to do their jobs effectively, and 
in-house training was limited. (5) 
In part due to Canaris' poor personnel selection and 
his bad management skills, the Abwehr lacked political 
cohesiveness and needed a foundation of internal guidelines 
to insure and maintain quality. Inefficiency among 
personnel was never really controlled. While this may not 
have been detrimental in Canaris' early years with the 
Abwehr, it took its toll later when ill-thought-out 
intelligence operations marked by confusion, overlapping 
targets, and misinformation became more and more frequent. 
Abwehr I was the espionage division and the 
coordinating head for espionage activity in the field. Its 
function was to collect information of military value to the 
Third Reich. It had sections that dealt specifically with 
naval, army, air force, and economic intelligence. (6) 
Abwehr II handled sabotage in enemy territory, infiltration, 
and subversion. Abwehr III dealt with counterespionage and 
security. The "Ausland" branch was the foreign liaison 
I 
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division, and it preserved contact between the OKW and the 
Foreign Office. It evaluated information from the foreign 
press and kept the OKW apprised of developments in Germany's 
foreign policy and of the domestic and foreign affairs of 
other countries as far as they affected the military 
situation. (7) A Central Group was also formed by Canaris 
within the Abwehr. The "Zentralabteilung" was the 
administrative division which handled personnel records and 
finances. It also kept the agent information files and the 
central index of agents. (8) 
All military espionage operations were the 
responsibility of Abwehr I. Its operative sections were 
broken into geographical divisions, each dealing with a 
particular country or area. Within the zone of German 
military jurisdiction--that is, Germany and its occupied 
territories--Abwehr I was the coordinating force behind 
Abwehr field offices known as "Abwehrstellen" or "Asts."(9) 
However, Abwehr I usually did not direct the day-to-day 
operations of the field units, nor did it evaluate incoming 
intelligence. Information was routed to the office which 
had requested it, or to the agency which held 
jurisdiction. (10) 
These major intelligence centers had subposts 
designated "Abwehrnebenstellen," which were augmented by 
intelligence outposts known as "Abwehraussenstellen."(11) 
The field units, in conjunction with Abwehr headquarters, 
were responsible for all aspects of military espionage, 
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including the recruitment, training, and assigning of 
espionage agents. Theoretically, individual agents 
recruited by a particular "Ast" were sent to the country or 
area for which the "Ast" or its subpost were responsible. 
For example, agents enlisted by "Abwehrstelle" Hamburg or 
its subpost "Nebenstelle" Bremen were, in theory, 
responsible for espionage against the United States. (12) 
The "Asts" maintained divisions corresponding to the foreign 
territories they operated in. But these geographic 
assignments were not strictly observed. Several 
"Abwehrstellen" might send agents to the same place, while 
others might not have dispatched any agents at all. These 
factors contributed to the inefficiency of the operation and 
of the organization. 
In neutral countries or those allied with Germany, the 
Abwehr station was referred to as a "Kriegsorganisation" or 
KO. Generally, the KOs operated out of the individual 
German embassies or consulates, usually with some form of 
diplomatic immunity. (13) The country in which the KO was 
located served as a base for its various agents' operations 
and as a communications link for agents abroad. KO Spain, 
for instance, transmitted reports from its agents in Great 
Britain and Washington, D.C. to Abwehr headquarters in 
Germany. (14) 
As in the case of the "Asts," espionage activity in an 
area monitored by a specific KO was sometimes jeopardized 
because of duplication and the lack of a centralized policy. 
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Because of this confusion, apparently inherent in the 
overall Abwehr organization, work of the KOs often suffered. 
KOs did not have exclusive responsibility for espionage 
activity in their individual territory, thus interference 
between agents from different "Asts" or KOs was 
frequent. (15) Lack of communication and mismanagement of 
Abwehr operations and personnel caused overlapping of target 
choices and duplication of collected information. 
The structure of both the "Asts" and the KOs 
corresponded to that of Abwehr headquarters; each had 
sections for espionage, sabotage, and counterespionage, as 
well as for the various geographical and technical 
subdivisions. The existence and survival of the 
"Abwehrstellen" and KOs was largely dependent upon Germany's 
political and military success. Military gains or losses 
meant the addition or loss of an "Ast" or its subpost. 
Neutral countries and German allies were more tolerant of 
the KOs as long as Germany remained a major power to be 
feared. Indeed, it seemed the major criticism of the Kos 
came from members of the German Foreign Missions, who 
complained over the large number of Abwehr personnel with 
diplomatic passports who worked out of the consulates and 
jeopardized work of the genuine diplomats. KOs were not 
required to inform the consulates of incoming Abwehr 
personnel, their local formation, or operations and 
information gathered. (16) However, when the war began to go 
badly for Germany, the Allied victories encouraged those 
neutral countries with German diplomatic missions to expel 
Abwehr personnel working under diplomatic immunity. 
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The agent network was under the direction of Abwehr I, 
which dispatched agents on intelligence missions through its 
"Asts" or Kos. The agents were divided into categories 
designated by letters which signified their position in the 
Abwehr. An agent employed in peacetime was known as an 
"Friedensagent" or F-agent. Generally, F-agents watched 
over military movements and the defense capabilities of the 
country in which they were stationed, and also gathered 
technical, political, economic, and scientific information 
not readily available to Germany. "Spannungsagenten" or 
S-agents were those who worked in times of international 
crisis or political tension. They watched for an increase 
of military movement. Wartime agents, "Kriegsagenten," 
designated as A-agents, worked behind enemy lines during 
actual hostilities. A "Reiseagent" was an Abwehr scout or 
mobile informant, and was designated as an R-agent. (17) 
Others were known as "V-M~nner" or "Vertrauensm~nner", 
confidence men or trusted persons. 
A second category of agents, not directly employed by 
the Abwehr, operated under code-names. "Tramp," "Crown," 
and "Sex" are examples of code-names used by German agents 
in the United States. Code-name agents worked through 
either a "V-Mann" or a KO, and submitted their intelligence 
reports directly to these contacts. Sometimes they were 
employed, through their supervisor, as wireless operators 
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for groups of agents in foreign countries. (18) 
"Hinterminner" or "Unter-V-Minner" served as subagents 
and contact persons. The Abwehr had no direct dealings with 
these individuals, as they acted only as informers or 
couriers for certain Abwehr agents, sometimes unaware that 
they served as information sources for spies. (19) 
Agent recruitment and information resources for the 
Abwehr were greatly varied. In Germany, many organizations 
and individuals were enlisted, often with mixed results, 
since the division of responsibility between the government, 
party, and private organizations was frequently vague. The 
Abwehr utilized any means available in its effort to aid 
Germany in the intelligence contest. Military and naval 
personnel, diplomatic missions, trade delegations, and 
scientific institutes, which shared industry secrets, were a 
part of the Abwehr's network. Additionally, organizations 
such as the "Deutsches Ausland-Institut," which connected 
German emigrants and those of German heritage with the 
Fatherland, and the Nazi party's "Auslandsorganisation" for 
party members abroad, were also used, sometimes without the 
knowledge of these organizations. In addition, there were 
free-lance agents who operated independently and offered 
themselves to the Abwehr in the hopes of selling whatever 
they could obtain. There were also those whom Abwehr 
personnel approached and convinced through coercion, 
blackmail, or patriotism to act as spies. 
The United States was an unwitting host to many of 
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these individuals. Some were actively involved as Abwehr 
agents; others knowingly acted as intelligence sources. A 
third group innocently provided information to the Abwehr, 
often through institutions without apparent espionage ties. 
Although America attempted to maintain itself apart 
from the rest of the world's preoccupation with Hitler and 
National Socialism, its protective shell was cracked early 
in 1938 with the arrest of a man accused of passing 
information to the Germans. His apprehension resulted in 
the first Nazi spy trial in the United States. This first 
arrest, and others that followed soon after, awakened 
Americans to their vulnerability to forces abroad. The 
gravity of National Socialism in Europe and German espionage 
in America became more than a subject for discussion and 
unsubstantiated fears; it acquired sudden tangibility and a 
frightening reality. Germany had embarked on an aggressive 
espionage program; its threats were genuine. Americans 
found themselves vulnerable and subject to doubts concerning 
their country's defense. It seemed that rather abruptly the 
United States had been drawn into Nazi Germany's 
ever-widening circle of interest, as a military target for 
its intelligence agents. 
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CHAPTER Ill 
THE CRACK IN THE WALL: 
AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM AND THE FIRST NAZI SPY TRIAL 
After 1918, the United States retreated from its 
involvement with other nations and returned to its national 
policy of isolationism. Although America had been a 
latecomer to the war, its money, supplies, and manpower were 
decisive factors in the Allied victory. The United States 
emerged a world power, and a nation to which much of the 
world owed a large financial debt. However, many Americans 
were disillusioned, saddled as they were with inflation, 
influenza, and war debts their former allies were very vocal 
about not wanting to repay. Having fought to "save 
democracy" in the "war to end all wars," Americans were left 
with a world that was neither entirely democratic nor 
without conflict. Americans, bitter over what was seen as a 
senseless war and disgusted with their Allies' postwar 
attitudes, reacted by turning their backs on Europe and 
European problems. 
But isolationism in America turned into an illness. 
The symptoms were clear: fearing the country would be 
beseiged by hordes of people escaping the aftermath of war, 
Congress passed the restrictionist immigration laws of 1921 
and 1924, which greatly reduced the number of immigrants 
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allowed into the United States. America refused to adhere 
to the Treaty of Versailles, preferring to make separate 
peace treaties with Germany and its allies, primarily to 
avoid joining the League of Nations. The League was seen as 
a mechanism which would force Americans to deal with 
Europe's problems and fight European battles. The "Red 
Scare" of 1919-1920 and the raids against Communists and 
subversives in the United States were connected by some 
Americans to the 1917 Russian Revolution and to fears of 
spreading Communism. But this witchhunt for Communists was 
rooted in America's growing intolerance of foreigners and 
"radicals." 
While the United States rated itself a world power 
following World War I, it shunned world leadership and 
participation in world affairs in a tragically short-sighted 
way. America had cooperated in war but refused to commit 
itself to postwar efforts to insure peace. National 
isolationism was strengthened throughout the 1920's by these 
postwar attitudes. American's greatest desire was to forget 
the great crusade of the World War and the problems in 
Europe, and return to the less complicated prewar days of 
peace and comfort. Warren G. Harding called this a return 
to "normalcy." For many others, this era of conservatism, 
intolerance, and isolationism was remembered fondly as the 
prosperous days of the "Roaring Twenties." 
The advent of the Great Depression in late 1929 
accentuated America's fear of foreigners and foreign 
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entanglements and contributed to its restrictionism and 
isolationism, as did the increased militarism in Europe and 
Japan. In his first inaugural address, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt likened the Depression to a foreign invader, and 
demanded " •.• broad Executive power to wage a war against the 
emergency •••• "(1) Cognizant of its domestic problems above 
all else, the United States attempted to close ranks. The 
Depression fostered a mood of national despair and 
confusion, marked by disappointment and disillusionment with 
the state of world affairs. Americans wanted only to stay 
out of foreign wars, and at first saw no danger to 
themselves from the belligerents across the Atlantic and the 
Pacific. Congress accepted the isolationist mood of the 
country and, beginning in 1935, enacted a series of 
Neutrality laws to keep the nation from becoming involved in 
any war "over there." 
However, public opinion in America was increasingly 
offended by the domestic policies of the Nazis, which were 
dominated by intense anti-Semitism. In addition, Germany's 
growing cooperation with Italy and Japan--indicated by 
mutual adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact and the 
Tripartite Pact--alarmed many Americans, who feared an 
international conspiracy against democracy. Of the three 
nations that threatened world peace and security, Nazi 
Germany was the most violent in its hatreds and the most 
powerful in the resources and technology of modern war. 
Consequently, it seemed the most dangerous to the United 
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States. 
Aggressive rhetoric emerging from Germany seemed to 
confirm this view, as did the growth of fascist-related 
organizations in the United States. The Friends of the New 
Germany preceded the German-American Bund, whose members 
openly wore a Nazi style uniform complete with swastika 
emblems. William Pelley's Silver Shirts, even Father 
Charles Coughlin's Social Justice Movement, and the 
revivified Ku Klux Klan, which sported an ideological 
alliance with the Bund, were the purveyors of a strain of 
violently abusive propaganda that at once vilified the 
"enemies" of the new Germany and lauded the National 
Socialist state. (2) This type of endorsement of the Third 
Reich generated fear in the minds of some Americans about 
the importation of National Socialist ideals and of Nazi 
subversion in America thought to be financed from Germany. 
Feelings against Germany were strong as early as June of 
1935, when the German ambassador to the United States 
reported to Berlin that anti-German propaganda had increased 
and that America had become "one of the main centers of 
anti-German agitation."{3) 
News of the capture of the first German spies since 
World War I broke across the United States in February, 
1938, in a wave of publicity. The reputed size and range of 
the Nazi espionage ring in America shocked many. Even more 
startling was the discovery of the apparent ease with which 
these agents had operated, the majority without any 
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professional training. 
Guenther Gustav Rumrich brought about the unmasking of 
this particular group. A naturalized American of German 
birth, an unmitigated failure in civilian life, and a 
deserter from the United States army, Rumrich found his 
niche after reading the memoirs of Colonel Walter Nicolai, 
who had headed German military intelligence during World War 
I. (4) In January, 1936, Rumrich wrote to Nicolai in care of 
the Nazi Party newspaper, the Volkischer Beobachter. He 
volunteered himself as a spy for Germany, stating that if 
the Germans could use his services, they should insert an 
advertisement in the New York Times addressed to "Theodor 
Koerner."(5) Nicolai forwarded the letter to the head of 
Abwehr I, Colonel Hans Piekenbrock, who in turn gave it to 
the Hamburg branch which acted on Rumrich's proposal. On 
April 6, 1936, the New York Times contained an 
advertisement which read: "Theodor Koerner-Letter received, 
please send reply and address to Sanders, Hamburg 1, Postbox 
629, Germany."(6) 
Rumrich was enlisted as a spy and worked under the 
direction of Dr. Erich Pfeiffer of the Hamburg branch of the 
Abwehr. Rumrich's small group had the cover name of "Crown" 
and operated in conjunction with a larger ring codenamed 
"Ilberg."(7) "Crown" operated for approximately twenty 
months, during which time Rumrich was able to gather various 
bits of information, such as the number of cases of VD in 
the United States Army and the signal code the army used in 
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ship-to-shore communications. He sent the information back 
to Pfeiffer by way of Karl Schlueter, Abwehr courier and a 
steward on the German ocean liner "Europa."(8) 
Much of the mail sent to Germany by the spy ring in 
the United States first went to a mail drop in Scotland, 
where the letters were routed on to the Abwehr. (9) The 
mailman delivering to the drop, a beauty parlor in Dundee 
owned by a woman named Jessie Jordan, noticed the large 
quantity of foreign mail and reported it to British 
counterintelligence. Since many of the suspicious letters 
were sent from New York, the British notified the FBI, which 
found upon reading the mail, evidence of the "Crown" 
operation in New York. (10) 
At the same time, Rumrich had been asked by Pfeiffer 
to get a number of blank American passports for Nazi agents 
abroad, and had been promised $1000 for the delivery. 
Unfortunately, Rumrich did not understand the difference 
between blank passports and passport blanks, the latter 
merely the form used when applying for a passport. 
Pretending to be "Edward Weston, Undersecretary of State," 
Rumrich called the New York branch of the passport division 
and demanded that 50 passport blanks be sent to him at his 
hotel. (11) 
Because the request was so contrary to procedure, 
because no one knew an Under Secretary of State named Edward 
Weston, and because passport blanks were available to anyone 
who wanted them, the clerks notified Federal authorities, 
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who prepared a fake package for "Mr. Weston." What followed 
next was a comedy of hide-and-seek, with Rumrich rerouting 
the package by telephone and the Alien Squad of the New York 
police department tailing after. Rumrich was finally 
arrested on February 15, 1938, and was turned over to the 
FBI where he faced evidence the FBI had amassed concerning 
activities of the "Crown" ring. (12) 
Rumrich not only confessed to his own position in the 
"Crown" ring, but turned state's evidence and implicated 
others, including those agents he knew who were involved in 
"Ilberg." The ramifications of Rumrich's arrest and 
confession were significant in that he exposed the 
activities of agents who had since left the country. 
"Ilberg" and its predecessor "Sex" had had long and 
successful operating careers prior to the confession of 
Rumrich, dating back to 1927, when the first agent of "Sex" 
entered the United States. (13) 
"Sex" was an abbreviation of an alias, "William 
Sexton," one of many used by William Lonkowski. Lonkowski 
joined the Abwehr shortly after the first World War. 
Because of his background in aviation he was sent to the 
United States in the late twenties to gather intelligence 
for the German airforce, which was forming secretly. 
Lonkowski and two co-agents worked in the American air 
industry under this operative code name. (14) In the late 
twenties and early thirties Lonkowski and his two 
confederates, Werner Georg Gudenberg and Otto Voss, were 
able to send the Abwehr aircraft secrets copied and stolen 
from the various plants where they had worked. These 
included the Curtiss Aircraft plant in New York, which at 
the time, was producing equipment for the government. 
In 1934, Lonkowski merged his ring with that of Dr. 
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Ignatz Griebl, who used the codename "Ilberg." Griebl had 
come to the United States after World War I, where he set up 
a physician's practice in New York and became an American 
citizen. Like Guenther Rumrich, Griebl volunteered his 
services as an espionage agent through a letter, in this 
case to the Nazi Propaganda Minister, Joseph Goebbels. {15) 
In order to recruit suitable individuals to help him, 
Griebl involved himself in the Friends of the New Germany, 
the organization which preceded the German-American Bund, 
through which William Lonkowski heard of Griebl's 
activities. The two joined forces, using Lonkowski's friends 
and the courier system developed by Griebl, which utilized 
the German ocean liners of the Hamburg-American and North 
German Lloyd lines and selected crew members as a 
transmission service to and from Germany. (16) In addition, 
they acquired contacts at American defense installations and 
manufacturing plants, and over an extended period of time, 
were successful in obtaining military information for the 
Abwehr. Their intelligence coups included: obtaining 
specifications from the Sikorsky plant at Farmingdale, Long 
Island, of pursuit planes reputed to be the fastest in the 
world; plans for a navy scout bomber being built by Vought 
Aviation; bombers being developed by Boeing and Douglas; 
blueprints of three destroyers; drawings for a new 
anti-aircraft gun and for an experimental army plane for 
night bombing; and classified U.S. Army maps. (17) All 
information was sent by way of courier to Pfeiff er in 
Germany. 
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It was on one of his deliveries to the courier on 
board the "Europa" in September, 1935, that Lonkowski was 
stopped and searched by U.S. customs guards. His pockets 
and the violin case he was carrying were found to contain 
documents, drawings of planes, and film negatives which 
detailed an airplane that turned out to be a new Curtiss 
light bomber. (18) Lonkowski was questioned and, oddly 
enough, released with instructions to return the next 
morning for further interrogation. With Griebl's help, 
Lonkowski escaped across the Canadian border and from there 
boarded a German freighter that returned him to Germany. 
Why Lonkowski was allowed to leave remains unclear, 
unless the importance of the documents and films he was 
concealing was not immediately recognized, though American 
intelligence personnel had been called in to examine the 
material. What is certain is that American officials 
exhibited a high degree of naivete in this incident. Aside 
from his name and the information he was carrying, Lonkowski 
yielded nothing in questioning. In fact his position, the 
success of "Operation Sex," and his escape were never fully 
revealed or understood until Guenther Rumrich became the key 
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witness for the Federal prosecution in the spy trial of 
October, 1938. "Operation Sex," renamed "Operation Ilberg," 
had been able to operate for almost three more years without 
interruption from American authorities. 
In June, 1938, following Rumrich's arrest and the 
grand jury hearings, eighteen individuals were charged by 
Federal indictment with having conspired to violate American 
espionage laws. The Federal authorities took the almost 
unprecedented step of naming all those indicted as agents of 
the German government. The New York Times reported on 
June 21: 
... Germany was officially named as the party 
responsible for the under-cover force that 
aggressively sought to pry out the best technical 
military defense secrets of the United States. (19) 
However, only four faced trial on October 14, 1938, 
and were subsequently convicted. Otto Voss, Lonkowski's 
aide who worked at the Sikorsky aircraft plant, received a 
six year sentence, and Johanna Hofmann, who had worked as a 
hairdresser and courier on the "Europa," got four years. 
For his theft of the Army's ship-to-shore communications 
code, Erich Glaser, a private in the Eighteenth 
Reconnaissance Squadron stationed at Mitchell Field, Long 
Island, received a two year sentence. Gustav Rurnrich 
pleaded guilty to the indictment of espionage and was also 
sentenced to two years. (20) 
The others named in the Federal indictment had either 
escaped the United States or had never left Germany. Karl 
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Schlueter was exposed as a courier, but escaped arrest. Dr. 
Ignatz Griebl and Werner Gudenberg had been recruited by the 
FBI as witnesses following Rumrich's arrest, and both 
testified for the Federal Grand Jury in May, 1938, before 
the indictments were handed down in June. Though Rumrich's 
earliest admissions had identified them as part of the Nazi 
espionage ring, they seemed willing enough to testify and 
were neither bonded nor guarded by the FBI. They eluded 
trial by returning to Germany on the ships which had served 
the couriers, supposedly with neither ticket nor 
passport. (21) An attempt to arrest Griebl when the "Bremen" 
made its first stop in France was foiled by the Captain who 
refused to give up Griebl to the French police. (22) Erich 
Pfeiffer, who directed the spies in America for the Abwehr, 
was indicted "in absentia."(23) 
1938 proved to be a landmark year in terms of 
German-American relations: it marked the beginning of a 
steady erosion of isolationist convictions within the United 
States and culminated in the recall of the German and 
American ambassadors from their respective posts. Guenther 
Rumrich's arrest in February, the federal indictments of 
eighteen Nazi spies in June, and the spy trial in October 
were seen by Americans in light of a series of 
Nazi-initiated European crises. These included the 
annexation of Austria in March, the threat to Czechoslovakia 
in the summer of 1938, and the attacks on Jewish life and 
property during the "Kristallnacht" pogrom in November. 
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These events all served to increase American anxiety and 
hostility toward Germany's aggressive internal and external 
policies. 
Relations between the two countries deteriorated to 
such an extent in 1938 that German Ambassador Dieckhoff 
wrote in November to the Foreign Ministry of a " .•. storm of 
anti-German feeling sweeping America."(24) Similarly, 
before his recall, American Ambassador Hugh Wilson described 
the Nazi-backed attacks on Jews in Germany, and stated, 
" .•• these pogroms dispel any hope of moderation in 
German-American relations."(25) 
German diplomats in the United States were under no 
illusions that Germany could count on America's isolationist 
sentiment in all circumstances; indeed, the events of 1938 
led many Americans to view world developments as an 
ideological struggle between democracy and dictatorship--a 
conflict between good and evil. In the minds of some 
Americans, the Nazis became the subverters of peace, truth, 
and virtue. The discovery of Nazi spies in America was seen 
as a personal attack on the nation and a conspiracy designed 
to undermine the allegiance of naturalized German-Americans. 
The Rumrich trial alerted the United States government 
and the American public to the gravity of the German 
espionage problem. The three male defendants in the Rumrich 
trial were naturalized American citizens, as were other 
important members of the spy ring, including Griebl and 
Gudenberg. That these individuals had taken an oath of 
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allegiance to the United States and had forsworn loyalty to 
the country of their birth made their crimes all the more 
treacherous. Their betrayal seemed to give credence to the 
fear that German-Americans were being manipulated by the 
Third Reich, and that the international community of people 
of German blood were part of Hitler's German "Volk," with 
all of the obligations the term implied. Though the average 
American was more than a little confused about the 
accomplishments and potential of German espionage in the 
United States as revealed by the media during the Rumrich 
trial, most were profoundly affected by the fact that 
German-born American citizens had chosen to spy upon their 
adopted country. 
The spy trial of 1938 and the activities of pro-Nazi 
groups such as the German-American Bund, which emphasized 
its connection to the Third Reich, ran afoul of American 
sensitivity toward organizations and individuals within the 
United States that maintained ties to another country. The 
trial also contributed to the public's reaction against 
National Socialism and reinforced popular suspicion of 
foreigners. This was partly because the information 
Americans acquired concerning German espionage in the United 
States was learned through media publicity--books, 
magazines, and newspapers--some of which tended to 
exaggerate and sensationalize the danger. (26) 
Magazine articles that wrote of "Expanding Espionage" 
and "Spy Scares" and asked, "Is America Infested With Nazi 
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Spies?" could not help but influence their reading public as 
to the magnitude of German spying in America. (27) Books 
such as Sabotage: How to Guard Against It, Armies of 
Spies, Secret Agents Against America, Total Espionage, 
and The Brown Network, all published in the United States 
before Pearl Harbor, at times used embellishment and 
allegation to capitalize on what was already known about 
America as a target for German espionage agents. (28) 
Americans were told that: 
Before the United States started paying attention 
to foreign agents, there were fifty thousand 
individuals in this country who .•• contributed to 
the stream of information whose end was in the Nazi 
espionage centers in Berlin and Hamburg. (29) 
It was also stated that the German diplomatic corps 
had been organized into a fifth column unit staffed by 
" •.. Nazi saboteur-diplomats ... " who began arriving in the 
United States in 1933 and subsequently " •.• entangled the 
forty-eight states in a web of secret destruction."(30) 
Many of these public sources attributed the growth of 
the Nazi spy system in the United States to the racial 
doctrine of the Hitler government which claimed: 
•.. every 'Aryan' born German abroad remains a 
German regardless of whether he has sworn allegiance 
to a foreign government or not. Germans abroad must 
be at the disposal of the Reich and are obliged to 
serve its interests. (31) 
Thus the foreign born, irrespective of citizenship, 
were labeled "aliens," and described as: 
••. individuals of an aggressively foreign 
character, wholly dissimilar from and unsympathetic 
to the standards and political system that prevail 
in the United States. A different 
allegiance--regardless of length of American 
residence--psychological estrangement and downright 
hostility are the characteristics of those who are 
the alien agitators, conspirators and spies •••• (32) 
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Nativism and distrust of foreigners was not new in the 
United States. But these attitudes toward Germans and 
German-Americans were strengthened in 1938 by Germany's 
actions abroad and the Rumrich trial, and because of 
associated published information Americans were reading and 
what they came to believe about the threat of German spies. 
Fears about Nazi espionage agents, and the 
increasingly strong conviction that a vast Nazi fifth column 
movement operated in the United States, led to restrictions 
on immigrants from Germany and those refugees escaping 
National Socialism. Assuming that the Nazis only allowed 
selected individuals to emigrate, many Americans, including 
a number of State Department officials, felt that refugees 
from Germany were part of a German fifth column movement 
sent to threaten the security of the United States. (33) 
Assistant Secretary of State Breckenridge Long, who was in 
charge of the State Department's Visa section, and a number 
of his subordinates believed there was a subversive element 
among applicants for visas to America, and that many 
refugees were fifth columnists in disguise. (34) Long wrote 
in his diary: 
It is very apparent that the Germans are using 
visitor's visas to send agents and documents through 
the United States and are using their Consulates in 
the United States as headquarters for their 
nationals who enter on transit permits and who are 
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carrying confidential documents •.•. (35) 
The suspicion that spies were entering the United 
States in the guise of refugees actually had very little 
basis in fact. The nation's immigration quota system and 
the State Department's visa regulations were very tight. 
Many of the American Consuls abroad whose responsibility it 
was to issue visas felt it was also their responsibility to 
keep the number issued down to a minimum. (36) Ultimately 
each "alien" was required to have two American sponsors, and 
the sponsors were asked to submit loyalty or moral 
affidavits. (37) These actions were partially attributable 
to the Rumrich trial and the developing fear of German 
espionage in America. 
Because German agents had indeed been arrested, there 
was some obvious basis of fact for the fears the nation 
harbored concerning naturalized German-Americans and a fifth 
column in the United States sponsored by the Third Reich. 
But German espionage was not as widespread as people seemed 
ready to believe, nor was the United States the veritable 
"paradise for spies" as was claimed in Total Espionage by 
Curt Riess, a popular book of the period. (38) Nevertheless, 
following the 1938 arrest and indictment of German spies, 
there was a demand for stronger and more adequate 
anti-espionage defenses in the United States. 
What passed for counterespionage action in the United 
States had so far proven more of a liability than an asset 
by the Rumrich case. Certainly the FBI had done little to 
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validate J. Edgar Hoover's claim that his men had "smashed" 
the greatest German spy ring since the First World War; many 
of the important members had escaped and others in America 
and Germany remained untouched. (39) 
This ineffective counter-spying was excused by the 
implication that America's innate purity had kept it from 
the tradition of warfare that required counterespionage 
tactics: 
Through many of our wars and most of the 
prospering intervals of peace one might have hidden 
all available American counter-spies behind a 
telegraph pole. And this absolute lack has appeared 
to be a special blessing, conferred on America by 
the temperament of the nation •••. (40) 
It was claimed that, prior to the threats on democracy 
from Germany, Japan, and Italy, America had had no need of 
an espionage or counterespionage system because: 
The United States was not imperialistic; it had no 
desire to make conquests and therefore was not 
military. As for industrial espionage--America had 
no need of it. No spy could learn from another 
country anything that America did not already know. 
American industry was further developed than the 
industry of any other country. (41) 
When sentencing the four convicted German spies in 
late November, 1938, the presiding judge publicly chided the 
FBI for its carelessness and ineptitude in letting members 
of the spy ring escape. (42) Shortly after the trial, 
President Roosevelt announced that the need for a stronger 
espionage force was to be served through the coordinated 
forces of the FBI and army and navy intelligence. (43) 
America's counterespionage facilities were to be improved 
and expanded in order to combat the intelligence threat to 
the nation posed by Nazi Germany. 
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1938 was a shocking year that portended things to 
come. Hitler's Third Reich was beginning to alter the face 
of Europe, and in America there was a gradual change in the 
isolationist conviction that the United States could live as 
an island unto itself. The Rumrich trial and the publi~ty 
that followed awakened the country to its vulnerability to 
enemy agents, and steps were taken to tighten security. 
However, what the FBI had uncovered with the aid of 
Rumrich's testimony did not disturb the core of Abwehr 
agents in the United States. These agents were able to 
operate, apparently unimpeded, for almost three more years. 
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ANATOMY OF A SPY NETWORK 
In February, 1939, William G. Sebold, a naturalized 
American of German birth, returned to Germany to visit his 
family. Sebold had left Germany after World War I, having 
served in the Kaiser's army. In the United States, he 
worked in various industrial and airplane plants throughout 
the country. On disembarking his ship in Hamburg, Sebold 
listed his occupation on the landing card as a mechanic with 
the Consolidated Aircraft Company plant in San Diego, 
California. This information appealed to the Gestapo and 
Sebold was invited to their Dilsseldorf office. (1) 
When Sebold declined, the Gestapo officials revealed 
that they knew of Sebold's past criminal record. In his 
youth, Sebold had spent time in German jails for smuggling 
and other offenses. Apparently Sebold had not revealed 
these criminal activities to the American authorities when 
applying for citizenship. Threatened with reprisals against 
his family, a concentration camp stay, divulgence of his 
past sins, and perhaps the revocation of his American 
citizenship, Sebold went to the Gestapo office where he 
accepted an offer to work as a German spy. (2) 
Sebold's case was forwarded by the Gestapo to the 
"Abwehrstelle" in Hamburg, which was in charge of espionage 
39 
against the United States. The head of the air intelligence 
sector at Hamburg, Major Nikolaus Ritter, was told by the 
Gestapo that Sebold had "volunteered" to act as a spy and 
had been thoroughly checked out. The Gestapo recommended 
he be hired by the Abwehr for work in America. (3) It was 
the policy of the Abwehr, as ordered by Admiral Canaris, not 
to use pressure, threats, or blackmail in the recruitment of 
agents. The principle of such action was not questioned as 
much as it simply was bad for public relations and would 
limit enlistment. The fact that the Abwehr took William 
Sebold on as an agent shows how little the Reich agencies 
communicated with one another. The Gestapo's methods were 
not those of the Abwehr, yet it was almost taken for granted 
by Ritter that Sebold had volunteered, as the Gestapo 
maintained, and that he would work diligently for Germany 
despite his American citizenship. 
It was arranged for Sebold to attend the spy school in 
Hamburg where he was trained in the use of a Leica camera 
and shown how to make microphotographic reductions of 
documents. He was taught how to use secret inks, Morse 
telegraphy, codes, and the shortwave radio.(4) Ritter 
preferred using American citizens as radio operators; thus 
Sebold's job in the United States would be to radio 
intelligence gathered by other agents back to Germany, or 
make microphotographs of documents for mailing to the 
Abwehr. 
Prior to his return to the United States, 
Sebold--codename "Tramp"--was supplied with a forged 
American passport made out to "William Sawyer", $1000 in 
American currency, and a list of four agents in New York 
whose reports he was to forward to Germany. They were: 
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Frederick Joubert Duquesne, Lilly Stein, Everett Roeder, and 
Hermann Lang. (5) Sebold met with each after his return to 
America in early February, 1940. 
Under instructions from his Abwehr contact, Major 
Ritter, Sebold set up a front for his operations called the 
"Diesel Research Company," and in a house on Long Island, 
installed a shortwave radio with which he contacted Hamburg 
with messages from agents. (6) All communications were to be 
sent in code, the key being a popular novel of the period, 
All This and Heaven Too by Rachel Field. (7) 
Sebold was an extremely conscientious radio operator, 
and maintained almost daily communication with the Abwehr in 
Germany. Using the call letters CQDXVW-2, he sent out 
prompt weather reports and was always up to date on ship 
movements in and out of New York harbor. (8) However, the 
primary importance of Sebold and his radio lay in the speed 
with which important information could be transmitted from 
America to Germany. Vital communications concerning ships, 
their destinations and cargoes tolerated no delay, 
particularly if the German U-boats wanted to plot intercept 
coordinates. All urgent messages from agents were 
transmitted by radio, while less important or longer reports 
went via courier. Consequently, it was necessary to have a 
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trained and reliable radio operator who could get the 
intelligence out, and William Sebold was eminently 
qualified. In fact, his station functioned so dependably 
that Major Ritter expanded the group for which Sebold 
transmitted. Agents who operated under other Abwehr 
officers were allowed to use Sebold as their communications 
channel. (9) As a result, Sebold became acquainted with a 
number of German agents working in the New York area. As 
did Sebold, many of them worked with the Duquesne ring, 
while others operated independently or in conjunction with 
other groups. 
The importance of William Sebold cannot be stressed 
enough, because unfortunately for the Abwehr, Sebold was the 
key figure that brought down one of its largest spy rings 
operating in America. While Sebold was visiting his family 
in Mulheim, and being pressured by the Gestapo in 
Dusseldorf, he visited the American Consulate in Cologne, 
ostensibly to send some money to a family member in the 
United States. (10) There he confided to consular officials 
the attempt on the part of the Germans to blackmail him into 
becoming a spy for the Abwehr and his wish to cooperate with 
the American authorities in order to expose the German spy 
organization in the United States. (11) Thus Sebold appeared 
to go along enthusiastically with the Abwehr's plans for him 
in America, and did well at the Abwehr's spy school in 
Hamburg. 
When Sebold returned to the United States early in 
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1940, State Department officials notified the FBI of the 
deception, and from that time on Sebold worked with the FBI. 
Between January, 1940, and June, 1941, when arrests were 
made, all contacts between Sebold and his co-agents that 
took place in Sebold's Diesel Research office were recorded 
and filmed through one-way mirrors by the FBI. Sebold's 
radio station on Long Island was manned by a Federal agent 
and all messages sent to the Abwehr were either screened for 
dangerous information, or were sent intact and the plans or 
facts behind the intelligence changed. (12) For nearly 
eighteen months William Sebold served as the communications 
link for almost all of the American-based agents of the 
Hamburg branch of the Abwehr, as well as for an assortment 
of other agents from various branches and KOs, all of whom 
were monitored by the FBI. 
Frederick Joubert Duquesne was the accepted leader of 
the group of German spies in America organized by the 
Abwehr's Major Ritter. A native of Cape Colony, South 
Africa, and a naturalized American, Duquesne was in his 
sixties when Sebold first met him, but still played an 
active role in the espionage activities of his New York 
ring. 
Duquesne had worked for German intelligence to 
sabotage British shipping during the First World War. He 
was arrested in New York in 1918 and an attempt to extradite 
him was made by the British, who charged him with murder in 
connection with the sinking of the British steamship 
43 
"Tennyson."(13) However, Duquesne escaped authorities until 
1932, and by then Britain was no longer interested in 
extradition on the old murder charge. In October, 1937, 
when Major Nikolaus Ritter arrived in the United States to 
oversee the formation of a new spy group, he contacted 
Duquesne who had remained on the Abwehr's "sleeper" list as 
a prospective agent, and enlisted him to work actively for 
the Abwehr. 
Duquesne's ability to supply information endeared him 
to his Abwehr masters, who were often amazed at his skill. 
However, his aptitude in procurement involved no real 
mystery. Security and censorship were not always rigidly 
enforced in the United States, and evidently Duquesne was 
sufficiently talented to avoid incurring suspicion when he 
attended Army maneuvers or visited ships in New York Harbor, 
camera or notepad in hand. In addition, Duquesne used a 
variety of information contacts, who provided him with 
scraps of intelligence which he forwarded to Germany for 
insertion into the larger espionage puzzle. 
When other means failed, Duquesne often obtained his 
intelligence through letter writing. He was able to obtain 
a great deal of knowledge about American industrial products 
and manufacturing conditions through written communications 
in which he described himself as a student of the industry, 
or as a wholesaler. (14) For example, to acquire information 
on a new gas mask the Army's Chemical Warfare Service was 
developing, Duquesne wrote a letter to the head of the 
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Service, identifying himself as a "well-known, responsible, 
and reputable writer and lecturer," as well as a "good 
citizen," and received what he had asked for through the 
mail. (15) Duquesne claimed to have obtained photographs of 
a new Navy speedboat by writing to the Navy Department in 
Washington. (16) 
The intelligence Duquesne acquired included: 
information on a new Garand rifle; tanks and anti-tank 
weapons; the specifications of a new bomb he claimed the 
DuPont plant in Delaware had developed; various drawings and 
designs; reports on the nature and extent of equipment being 
sent to Great Britain; and data on ship sailings. (17) It 
was Duquesne who reported Churchill's arrival in the United 
States on the "King George V" in February, 1941, which of 
course was patently untrue, but impressed everyone back in 
Germany nevertheless since the ship had been in Annapolis 
in January. (18) Whether true or not, Duquesne always had 
something to send. 
By the time William Sebold arrived in the United 
States to take up his guise as a radio operator for the 
Abwehr, Frederick Duquesne had become more interested in 
sabotage then in mere spying. He informed Sebold (and the 
FBI) of his plans to blow up the General Electric plant in 
Schenectady, New York, and sabotage the DuPont powder works 
at Wilmington, Delaware. He also suggested putting a bomb 
in Franklin Roosevelt's church at Hyde Park. (19) In 
addition, Duquesne advocated burning the French liner 
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"Normandie," which had been refitted as a United States Navy 
auxiliary ship and renamed the "Lafayette."(20) 
Duquesne's proposed methods of sabotage included his 
own invention, the "chiclet" bomb. According to Duquesne, 
one chewed the gum thoroughly and then folded it around a 
phosphorous compound, after which it could be planted 
anywhere without arousing suspicion. The greatest advantage 
of the "chiclet" bomb was its inability to explode in 
temperatures under 72 degrees. (21) Temperatures above 72 
degrees would trigger a chemical reaction, causing the 
phosphorous compound to generate intense heat, igniting 
whatever it was attached to. Duquesne explained that a 
similar incendiary device could be made with candy. For big 
jobs he preferred a lead-pipe bomb with dynamite caps and a 
slow-burning fuse. (22) 
Hermann Lang, another of Sebold's contacts in America, 
had proved to be one of the Abwehr's greatest American spy 
coups, and a personal success for Major Ritter of 
"Abwehrstelle" Hamburg and his spy operation in the United 
States. Lang worked as an assembly inspector at the Norden 
plant, and had stolen and made copies of many of the 
assembly blueprints of the Norden bombsight for the Abwehr. 
In its quest for intelligence from the American Air 
Force and aircraft industry, the German espionage 
organization had long been interested in the bombsight 
developed by American inventors. Reportedly, this bombsight 
enabled a bombardier to determine the exact moment a bomb 
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must be dropped to accurately hit a target. Different 
versions of this sight had been developed and, of course, 
the Abwehr was interested in any of them. Requests had gone 
out to the spy rings under Rumrich and Griebl in 1937, but 
none of the members had access to information concerning the 
bombsight. In fact, Hermann Lang sent the first sketches of 
the Norden bombsight to the Abwehr on his own initiative 
through one of the numerous letter drops employed by the 
Abwehr. The primary reason for sending Nikolaus Ritter to 
the United States was to facilitate the shipment of Lang's 
information back to Germany and coordinate an espionage 
ring. (23) 
Hermann Lang was a naturalized American citizen, born 
in Germany. His motives as a spy were unique, since he did 
not profess to be a believer in National Socialism nor did 
he hate the United States. He claimed no interest in 
monetary rewards for his work as a spy, though he did not 
refuse payment. He considered himself to be a good German, 
and his position as an assembly inspector at the Norden 
plant gave him access to some of the bombsight blueprints. 
Perhaps this and his misplaced patriotism were reasons 
enough for his theft of the material. 
For security reasons, sections of the sight were 
assembled at different plants. However, when Lang knew he 
would have custody of certain sectional blueprints for a 
number of days, he took them home at night and traced the 
prints rather than leaving them in the safe at the plant. 
Over a period of time, Lang smuggled copies of Norden 
bombsight parts to Germany by way of ship courier, where 
they were assembled. Missing parts were constructed by 
Luftwaffe engineers. (24) Lang himself made a trip to 
Germany--courtesy of the Abwehr--to help with assembling a 
new and improved bombsight, based on the Norden model, 
developed by German experts. There he received the 
congratulations of Hermann Goering. (25) 
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Major Ritter also recruited two more "sleepers" for 
work with the Abwehr during his trip to the United States in 
1937. Everett Roeder and Lilly Stein, along with Duquesne 
and Lang, became part of William Sebold's major contact 
circle. According to FBI sources, Roeder had been born in 
New York, but had evidently been approached by German 
authorities during a visit to Germany, in much the same 
manner as Sebold had been. (26) The difference between the 
two was that Roeder accepted the Abwehr's request to act as 
a spy, primarily because of the money promised for any vital 
information he could relay to Germany. Roeder was employed 
by the Sperry Gyroscope factory, which was involved in the 
production of the Sperry bombsight and gyroscopes. However 
until his activation by spymaster Ritter, Roeder was kept as 
a "sleeper," even during the Abwehr's crucial search for 
intelligence on the Norden bombsight. 
Roeder's employment as an engineer and designer at the 
Sperry plant gave him access to a variety of confidential 
mechanisms being developed for the United States Army and 
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Navy. His deliveries to the Abwehr included specifications 
of the radio instrumentation on the Glenn Martin bomber, 
drawings of range-finders, blind-flying instruments, a 
bank-and-turn indicator, and a navigator compass. (27) 
Roeder also derived an income from his work as an inventor 
of firearm-related devices, which he sometimes shared with 
the Abwehr. According to the FBI, Roeder was probably the 
Abwehr's greatest producer of detailed technical data in 
America. (28) 
Vienna-born Lilly Stein worked as a fashion model in 
New York City, and operated as a courier for Major Ritter. 
Because of her work as a model, Stein developed ties to 
influential people in New York and Washington. Her ability 
to move in society brought her into contact with many highly 
placed individuals, and she was able to pick up information 
by merely listening to the conversation of insiders.(29) 
In the United States, the Abwehr had other spy rings 
about which Sebold had varying degrees of information. 
Among these was the group under the leadership of Kurt 
Ludwig, an American of German parentage, who began his 
espionage career in the United States in March of 1940. 
Ludwig had spent most of his life in Germany, but upon 
reaching maturity had indicated his desire to retain his 
American citizenship. FBI records state that Ludwig claimed 
to have been involved with Adolf Hitler and the Nazis in the 
Munich "Putsch" of 1923, and that he knew many high 
officials in the Nazi party. (30) In fact, according to 
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Ludwig, it was Heinrich Himmler who encouraged him to become 
an Abwehr agent and practice his spy craft in the United 
States. (31) 
Ludwig received his instructions from spymaster Major 
Ulrich von der Osten of the Abwehr's KO in Spain. Upon 
arriving in the United States in 1940, Ludwig was directed 
to form an espionage ring and obtain information concerning 
the size, equipment, and location of American army, navy, 
and airforce bases along the Eastern seaboard, as well as 
information on arms production and convoy movements. Ludwig 
himself, usually accompanied by his secretary, Lucy 
Boehmler, visited nearly every Army camp and airfield on the 
East coast. 
Often either Ludwig or his companion would draw 
soldiers into conversations about their camp and its 
equipment, where they had been before and whether they were 
to be relocated. A favorite way to collect information was 
to pick up hitchhiking soldiers in the vicinity of army 
camps. Apparently Ludwig sometimes tried to disarm those he 
was questioning with his ignorance. In one instance, after 
picking up two soldiers, he asked if the airplanes lined up 
on the field could be bought for $1200. The soldiers 
responded that the particular planes sold for approximately 
$30,000 each. Ludwig then asked if the planes could fly as 
fast as the speed of an automobile, and whether a large 
cement mixer on the side of the road was an anti-aircraft 
gun. (32) Ludwig also visited many of the docks, harbors, 
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and war factories along the coast, and even toured the White 
House in Washington. (33) 
Ludwig's group of seven was for the most part a young 
and inexperienced company, with the noted exception of the 
group's technical advisor, Paul Borchardt-Battuta, a retired 
officer of the German army. FBI reports indicate that prior 
to his corning to the United States in early 1939, Borchardt 
had been placed in Dachau concentration camp because of his 
supposed Jewish heritage. He was released after only 
sixteen days, and with the help of German officials obtained 
a non-quota visa to the United States. (34) 
Borchardt had evidently been on the Abwehr's payroll 
for a number of years, and his stay at Dachau was an 
elaborate ruse designed to absolve him from suspicion in the 
United States. There is no doubt that Borchardt was sent to 
the United States specifically to secure information 
concerning its national defense preparations, thus marking 
Borchardt as one of the few about whom there is concrete 
evidence that he used his position as a "Jewish refugee" in 
order to engage in espionage against America. (35) 
Despite the youth of its members, the Ludwig ring was 
a productive and active organization. Aside from Borchardt, 
Ludwig's contacts included a soldier stationed at Governor's 
Island in New York Harbor. Rene Froehlich supplied Ludwig 
with lists of the admissions and discharges from the 
military hospital on Governor's Island, from which Ludwig 
was able to determine where specific military units were 
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stationed. Prior to his induction into the army, Froehlich 
had provided Ludwig with technical and military magazines, 
and in fact had established a magazine and book selling 
business through which he was able to procure these 
magazines, as well as army and navy publications at dealer's 
prices. (36) In his capacity as a soldier, Froehlich 
continued to provide Ludwig with technical publications 
concerning aviation and defense production, and had material 
from the army and navy directed to him which he turned over 
to Ludwig for transmission to Germany.(37) Rene Froehlich 
was born in Germany, but claimed American citizenship 
through the naturalization of his father. 
Hans Pagel and Frederick Schlosser were both members 
of the German-American Youth Movement, an affiliate of the 
Bund, and through this organization became acquainted with 
Ludwig. The two observed the ships and cargoes at the New 
York City waterfront, and with Ludwig visited some of the 
military establishments and defense plants in the area. (38) 
Schlosser was born in the United States but Pagel was a 
German citizen. 
Another member of the group, Karl Mueller, also 
accompanied Ludwig on trips to airports and defense plants 
on Long Island, and furnished him with information 
concerning airplane production in the United States. (39) 
The sixth member, Helen Mayer, was born in Brooklyn. 
She sought out individuals employed in the defense industry, 
developed relationships with them, and pumped them for 
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information about their jobs and production at their plants. 
Her home served as a frequent meeting place for her group 
and others interested in Germany's success, and she often 
held parties which were attended--according to one 
report--by "a lot of men with square-looking heads ••. and 
good Heinie names."(40) Mayer also helped Ludwig with his 
correspondence to Germany, and provided him with magazines 
and periodicals which contained information she deemed 
valuable to his activities. (41) 
Ludwig also employed Karl Schroetter of Miami, a 
naturalized American and a former deputy sheriff in 
Louisiana and Pennsylvania. Schroetter reported to Ludwig 
on the defense facilities located in Florida. (42) 
An important member of the ring was eighteen year old 
Lucy Boehmler, who acted as Ludwig's secretary. Boehmler 
accompanied Ludwig on his trips up and down the Atlantic 
seaboard checking army and navy camps. One of Lucy's most 
important duties as Ludwig's assistant was to keep an active 
card file on United States army camps, the disposition of 
American military forces, troop movements, and arms 
production. (43) 
Boehmler's routine chores included frequent perusal of 
the newspapers of the Eastern coast of the United States, as 
well as the study of a number of technical journals, 
manuals, or book publications such as Electrical World, 
Iron Age, and The Aircraft Yearbook. The American press 
harbored a wealth of information and was a cheap and 
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available source of intelligence. From selected newspaper 
sources, Lucy clipped articles pertaining to defense plants 
along the East coast, or items about soldiers home on visits 
to their families from camps identified in the reports. 
From technical publications she was generally able to glean 
significant details concerning production, raw materials, 
and shipments by railroad or steamship. (44) 
Lucy also maintained detailed records on Ludwig's 
observations and of the intelligence gathered by the group, 
and helped Ludwig in preparing secret messages for 
transmission back to the Abwehr. The information Ludwig 
sent by mail to Germany through mail drops in Spain or 
Portugal was either in code, or written on the backs or 
between the lines of normal letters with a mixture of 
Pyramidon--a headache remedy--and water. The mixture dried 
clear and invisible, but could be read if treated with 
iodine. (45) Lucy Boehmler was born in Germany, and like 
Hans Pagel and Frederick Schlosser, had been active in the 
Bund-affiliated German-American Youth group. 
The Ludwig and Duquesne groups represented the most 
successful period of German espionage in America, and what 
the Abwehr considered its highest level of producing agents 
in the United States. Of course, it could only benefit 
spymasters von der Osten, Pfeiffer, Ritter, and even Canaris 
to tout their operations and agents in America. The Abwehr 
procured intelligence; it did not evaluate the information. 
The Abwehr stations were supposed to dispense with blatantly 
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false intelligence before sending it on to the evaluating 
agencies, but they rarely had the comprehensive 
foreknowledge to know what to disregard, as in the case of 
William Sebold and the information he was forwarding to the 
Abwehr. The truth was that the structure of the Third 
Reich's intelligence apparatus fostered an uncontrolled 
competition that saw each agency that dabbled in espionage 
scrambling to be the first with the most. Consequently, the 
Abwehr felt obliged to jealously guard its position as the 
intelligence and counterespionage organ of the German armed 
forces, and to produce intelligence no matter how 
questionable the information or the agents who sent it, for 
there were other departments in the intelligence 
establishment of the Third Reich anxious to discredit or 
replace the Abwehr. 
Criticism of Abwehr activities in the United States 
between the beginning of the war in Europe and Pearl Harbor 
emanated strongly from the German diplomats stationed in 
America, particularly from the Charg~ of the German Embassy, 
Dr. Hans Thomsen. (46) Thomsen's boss, Foreign Secretary 
Joachim von Ribbentrop, resented the reputed success of the 
Abwehr in America and had sought to establish his own 
intelligence network through his diplomats and German 
missions abroad; however, he was forced to depend on the SD 
and Abwehr for the majority of his secret intelligence. (47) 
Ribbentrop opposed Abwehr actions in America for his own 
reasons, but used the ammunition supplied by Abwehr mishaps, 
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such as the exposure of Guenther Gustav Rumrich and the full 
story behind his enlistment in the Abwehr, to enhance the 
prestige of his own organization. Hans Thomsen also 
abhorred what he saw as incompetence on the part of the 
Abwehr because he feared the further degeneration of 
German-American relations. 
Germany's invasion of Poland in the fall of 1939, the 
invasion of Scandinavia, and the march across western Europe 
culminating in the fall of France in June of 1940, brought 
America closer to the side of Britain and further from 
neutrality. President Roosevelt responded in September, 
1940, with an executive agreement that transferred fifty old 
warships no longer in active service to the British in 
exchange for eight air and naval bases on British 
possessions ranging from Newfoundland to British Guiana. 
Roosevelt continued assistance to Britain in 1941 with 
Lend-Lease, which allowed goods and defense articles to go 
to any nation whose defense the President considered vital 
to the security of the United States. Both the 
bases-for-destroyers deal and Lend-Lease were violations of 
the neutrality claimed by the United States, and were, in 
essence, unofficial declarations of war against the Axis 
powers. 
In May, 1941, President Roosevelt declared an 
unlimited national emergency and seized Axis-owned or 
controlled ships in American ports. After the sinking of 
the American merchantman "Robin Moor" on May 21, 1941, by a 
German submarine, the President froze German and Italian 
assets in the United States and ordered their consulates 
closed. 
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The undeclared naval war between Germany and the 
United States intensified through the summer of 1941. In 
July, American troops occupied Iceland; and in September, 
President Roosevelt issued a shoot-on-sight order for German 
U-boats. Though isolationist groups decried the 
administration's obvious violations of neutrality and 
international law, most Americans apparently favored aid to 
Britain, even at the risk of involving themselves. 
Hans Thomsen, the German Charge, understood the 
climate of American public opinion probably better than any 
other German diplomat. He was cognizant of the dangers 
inherent in the attitudes of the political leaders of his 
own country, who evidently had preconceived notions 
regarding the power of the United States and its ability to 
institute substantial military interference in Hitler's 
plans. Between 1939 and 1941, Thomsen was forced to deal 
with increasing hostility from America, and an American 
image of Germany which more and more depicted the Third 
Reich as the enemy and a nation grasping for world 
domination. It comes as no surprise then, that Thomsen 
viewed the Abwehr activities in the United States with 
distaste and felt they could only jeopardize what were 
already antagonistic foreign relations. 
Thomsen felt that many of the spies he was familiar 
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with were unsuited for espionage activity and he feared that 
the exploitation of acts of German espionage would be used 
to further anti-German propaganda and perhaps to justify 
America's entry into the war. Thomsen felt the United 
States could be driven into a war, and used 1917 as an 
example, when, he claimed, American public opinion was 
incited as much by alleged and actual cases of sabotage as 
by Germany's unlimited submarine war. (48) 
Early in 1940, two men claiming to be Abwehr 
free-lance agents came to the German embassy in Washington 
asking for money. The two agents, Hausberger and Bergmann, 
claimed to have received instructions from the Abwehr's 
Major von der Osten to organize a sabotage ring in the 
United States. (49) Thomsen was angry not only because the 
Abwehr had spies and saboteurs in the United States, but 
because they had employed agents with so little wit and 
tact, who thought it natural to come to the embassy begging 
for funds. 
Thomsen saw the Abwehr's activities as one of the 
surest ways to bring about direct participation of the 
United States in the war. Seeing it as his task to prevent 
America's entry into the conflict, he asked that the 
Wehrmacht terminate Abwehr activities in America.(50) 
Admiral Canaris claimed the bumbling agents were not his, 
and denied that any orders had been given for sabotage 
operations in the United States. (51) It was further stated 
that the OKW shared the Foreign Ministry's political 
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objections to sabotage, and it was reiterated that no 
instructions had been given for such activities in the 
United States. As far as Canaris and the Abwehr were 
concerned, the statements of Bergmann and Hausberger were 
untrue. (52) An irritated Thomsen cabled back that if 
Hausberger and Bergmann were liars, then where did they get 
their explosives, and who was representing himself falsely 
as the Abwehr's Major von der Osten, who it was claimed, 
gave the two would-be saboteurs their instructions?(53) 
These accusations and denials could have gone on 
indefinitely. The Abwehr did not want to admit to anything 
that would get it into trouble, and it was clear that 
Thomsen's objections regarding the blundering and 
ineffectual Abwehr agents who were jeopardizing American 
neutrality, were damaging and were bound to reach 
influential ears. The German State Secretary, Ernst von 
Weizsaecker, to whom Thomsen reported, was concerned over 
the entire incident, since as late as April, 1940, Admiral 
Canaris had assured Ribbentrop that the Abwehr had no agents 
in the United States spying on the American army or 
navy. (54) Thomsen felt it was imperative that the Abwehr 
refrain from their activities and Canaris was asked to 
follow up on the agents whom Thomsen described as, 
" ••• totally unsuited for the job ••.• "(55) 
On June 10, 1940, the Abwehr suddenly remembered that 
it had employed the two agents as "observers," not as 
saboteurs, and that under the circumstances, the two men 
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should return to Germany. (56) Thomsen had won this 
particular battle, but not the war. The Abwehr continued to 
operate agents in the United States and Thomsen continued to 
rail against what he perceived as threats to American 
neutrality. Just ten days after the Abwehr admitted to 
hiring Hausberger and Bergmann, a new agent from Weisbaden 
arrived at the embassy and requested advice on where and how 
to install his shortwave radio, and also asked for support 
from the embassy in case of trouble with the American 
authorities. Thomsen's response to the OKW stated that, 
" ••• if the German military authorities must keep this method 
of procuring information, their agents must be prevented 
from contacting the German Diplomatic Missions."(57) When 
the arrests of the Duquesne and Ludwig rings were made in 
the summer of 1941, Thomsen wrote to the Foreign Office: 
Intelligence agencies in Germany indiscriminately 
trained totally unqualified persons and sent them to 
the United States. The operations of the German 
agencies were marked by naivete, carelessness and 
lack of coordination. (58) 
It was Thomsen's impression that the operations 
conducted by these irresponsible and incompetent agents had 
not benefitted Germany's conduct of the war, and had 
certainly cost them the sympathy of the Americans. (59) 
In September, 1941, the OKW formally objected to the 
criticism of the activity of the Abwehr in the United States 
made by the German embassy in Washington, but by then any 
discussion of the problem was, for the most part, academic. 
The arrests of the members of the Ludwig and Duquesne 
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espionage groups by the FBI effectively shut down the 
American-based spy rings so painstakingly developed by the 
Abwehr. Thomsen's attentions by then had turned elsewhere. 
He was preoccupied with what had essentially become the 
fiction of American neutrality, and the policies of the 
Roosevelt administration which clearly indicated that 
Germany's war with Britain ultimately meant American 
involvement. 
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CHAPTER V 
"THE GREATEST SPY ROUNDUP IN U.S. HISTORY" 
In a series of arrests beginning on June 28, 1941, the 
members of the Duquesne ring were taken into custody by the 
FBI. J. Edgar Hoover made the first announcement of what he 
described as, "the greatest spy roundup in American 
history .•. "; and by June 30, the Abwehr knew that 
thirty-three individuals associated with Duquesne had been 
arrested. (1) 
William G. Sebold was, of course, instrumental in the 
breakup of the Duquesne ring. Because Sebold took advantage 
of the lax security within the Abwehr's American 
organization, and the social club atmosphere where everyone 
knew everyone else, the FBI was aware of other individuals 
operating in the New York area. However, Kurt Ludwig and 
his eight associates were not picked up until August. The 
Ludwig group had been monitored as a separate case by the 
FBI, for although the agency knew various spies were 
operating apart from the Duquesne group, they were unsure of 
the scope and extent of this second spy ring. 
Ludwig communicated his intelligence primarily by 
letter through neutral country mail drops to Germany. He 
had a shortwave radio installed in his car and through it 
received instructions from the Abwehr.(2) He also made use 
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of a radio center in the Bronx set up by Axel Wheeler-Hill. 
Ludwig rarely, if ever, used Sebold's radio to send 
intelligence to the Abwehr. Thus the big break for the FBI 
on the Ludwig case came when the British secret service 
turned over a series of letters intercepted by British 
censors in Bermuda. All the letters had been sent from New 
York and signed "Joe K."(3) When the letters were tested 
chemically, the exposed message revealed that "Joe K." knew 
a great deal about American aircraft production and the 
identities of ships and their cargoes destined for Great 
Britain. (4) 
Despite the clues contributed by the British and the 
"exhaustive efforts" of the FBI, the Bureau was unable to 
confirm the true identity of "Joe K." However, their search 
was aided when a man named Julio Lopez Lido was run down and 
killed by a taxi in Times Square on March 18, 1941. Lido's 
companion was seen taking the dead man's briefcase following 
the accident, and apparently tried to gain possession of 
Lido's luggage from his hotel after learning of Lido's 
death. (5) Investigation after the accident--including a 
close examination of Lido's luggage--revealed that Julio 
Lido was actually Ulrich von der Osten of the German 
military intelligence service. 
Osten had come to the United States at the behest of 
Admiral Canaris to act as resident director of Abwehr 
agents, with orders to coordinate agent activities and 
improve overall organization. (6) Kurt Ludwig was of course, 
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Osten's companion, the man who had taken Osten's briefcase, 
and who attempted to gain access to Osten's luggage. When a 
letter to Germany from "Joe K." was intercepted--again by 
British censors--describing Osten's accident, federal agents 
were able to put the letter and the results of the 
investigation of Osten's death together and come up with 
Ludwig as the identity of "Joe K." 
FBI records confirm their knowledge of a connection 
between the Duquesne group and Ludwig; in fact, Ludwig was 
present at the arrest of two members of the Duquesne ring in 
a bookstore in New York City on June 28, 1941. (7) Before 
the arrest, the federal agents had observed Ludwig 
conferring with the two spies, but, " ... pretended not to 
notice him and allowed him to continue with his activities, 
he being under surveillance, of course."(8) 
Following the arrests of Duquesne and his company, 
Ludwig did little to merit FBI surveillance. Ironically 
enough, the Abwehr warned Ludwig to avoid relations with 
William Sebold--"Tramp"--lest he jeopardize Sebold's 
security. (9) Ludwig stopped all espionage activities until 
August, 1941, when during a trip across the country, his 
"inborn espionage instincts" caused him to take note of 
military camps and other defense establishments of interest 
to the Abwehr. (10) His cross-country trek was closely 
followed by the FBI, and when it became apparent that 
Ludwig's aim was to attempt to leave the United States for 
Germany by way of Japan, he was arrested in Cle Elum, 
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Washington. 
The trial of Frederick Joubert Duquesne and his 
thirty-two co-defendants began in September, 1941. Fourteen 
of the defendants, including Lang and Duquesne, entered 
pleas of not guilty, despite the movies, photos, recordings, 
and other incriminating evidence amassed by the FBI. The 
thirty-three defendants were indicted for violating the 
espionage statutes and for violation of the Federal 
Registration Act. All were convicted and collectively 
received more than 300 years in prison and were assessed 
fines amounting to $19,000. (11) Duquesne received a term of 
twenty years and a fine of $2,000; Hermann Lang received a 
term of twenty years; Everett Roeder was sentenced to 
sixteen years and Lilly Stein twelve years. (12) 
The only real drama in the trial was supplied by the 
appearance of William G. Sebold, who surprised his fellow 
agents and his Abwehr employers by revealing that he and his 
espionage activities were part of an FBI undercover 
operation. Sebold's testimony caused an uproar within the 
Abwehr, particularly since German intelligence had detected 
nothing that indicated Sebold's FBI affiliation. (13) In 
using Sebold, the Abwehr had neglected to take even the most 
elementary of precautions, and relied instead on the 
Gestapo's assurances that Sebold had "volunteered" and was 
thought to be a good candidate for espionage work. This 
said little for the Abwehr's screening process. The fact 
that Sebold was able to identify Major Ritter as the man who 
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hired him, and finger everyone in the Duquesne ring, as well 
as various other individuals, indicated that the Abwehr's 
security system was extremely poor. 
There was evidently a strong sense of immunity among 
the German agents in America, because they had been able to 
operate for so long without challenge by the American 
authorities. More and more agents were recruited who were 
not properly instructed in the precautions important to an 
operative's security. It is particularly obvious in the 
case of the Duquesne group that members violated the most 
important of espionage principles: that of isolation. There 
was no conscious effort within the group to keep anything a 
secret, and that made Sebold's job all the easier. 
The trial of Kurt Ludwig and his eight associates 
began on February 3, 1942, the first spy trial held in the 
United States after the attack on Pearl Harbor and after 
Germany's declaration of war on America. The nine were 
indicted on charges of conspiracy to violate the espionage 
statutes, and all were convicted. Lucy Boehmler, who turned 
state's evidence and became the government's chief witness, 
received the lightest sentence, five years. Kurt Ludwig, 
Rene Froehlich, and Paul Borchardt were each sentenced to 
twenty years. Helen Mayer, Karl Mueller and Hans Pagel 
received terms of fifteen years each; Frederick Schlosser 
received twelve years and Karl Schroetter, ten years. (14) 
Media coverage of both trials was heavy. Following 
the Rumrich trial in 1938 and the outbreak of war in Europe 
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in 1939, America had essentially declared open season on 
German spies and saboteurs. On September 6, 1939, President 
Roosevelt issued a directive which placed the FBI in charge 
of investigating all suspected espionage and sabotage within 
the United States. (15) Local police authorities throughout 
the nation were instructed to give the FBI all possible aid. 
The nation-wide spy hunt and the publicity generated by the 
spies, heightened awareness of who and what to look for. A 
natural consequence was that nearly every public-minded 
citizen fancied himself a counterespionage agent in league 
with the FBI. 
Books, magazines, and newspapers produced facts and 
figures which cited accidents, fires, and explosions on 
ships, trains, in defense plants, navy yards, airbases and 
army camps, and hinted that the cause was sabotage. (16) 
Everyone wanted to know whether or not the nation was 
overrun with Nazi spies and saboteurs. With so many 
arrested at once in late 1941, the answer seemed obvious. 
Thus, most people were interested in the captured spies, and 
there was a great deal of public fascination in their 
appearance, their past operations, and their trials. As was 
most often the case, the American public received its 
detailed information from newspapers, magazines and books, 
media that sometimes used stereotypes and sensationalism to 
heighten interest in the story. 
American readers were told that, " .•• some of the spies 
working for Hitler were known to consider an autographed 
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photo of their Fuhrer the most precious reward they could 
ask."(17) Lilly Stein of the Duquesne ring was described as 
a " ••• willowy person of about thirty who might have been 
pretty had it not been for a sneer that constantly played 
about her lips."(18) The FBI claimed Stein had aspirations 
of " .•. attaining fame as a second Mata Hari •••• "(19) Rene 
Froehlich was slurred less subtly: "Rene didn't have a bad 
first name--for him. It could have been a girl's name, and 
Froehlich walked like a girl."(20) 
During the Ludwig trial, a description of Helen Mayer 
listed her eyes as too small and too close together and her 
nose as long, bony, and pointed. (21) In fact, the reader 
was asked to make note of how the facial pattern was 
repeated in a number of the faces of those on trial. (22) It 
was noted that the government's chief witness, Lucy 
Boehmler, had a cool and withdrawn quality about her. This 
was attributed " ••• to the essential cold-bloodedness of her 
nature. She spied for the fun of it."(23) 
The characteristics of the FBI agents instrumental in 
the apprehension of Ludwig were quite different than those 
attributed to the German spies. The Bureau operatives at 
the trial were: 
••• young, intelligent, sure of themselves in a 
quiet, competent way. All of them seemed to be 
college graduates, and each man had had special 
training in the work he was assigned to do. They had 
the straight, clear eyes, the firm jaws, the steady 
look of men to whom life is a perilous adventure and 
who are not afraid of it. (24) 
Obviously the FBI was viewed as the nation's paramount 
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counterespionage agency, and the prime power which had 
"smashed" the enemy's spy rings. However, the position of 
the FBI was not as omnipotent as was believed, nor were the 
successful arrests attributable only to the efforts of the 
Bureau. 
The initial investigation of the Duquesne ring can be 
ascribed to the willingness of William Sebold to act as an 
inside informer for the FBI. Sebold was not obligated to 
work with the American authorities, but volunteered on his 
own initiative, though he knew his activities could endanger 
his family still in Germany. Similarly, the Ludwig case was 
initially broken by the British censorship authorities who 
gave their information to the FBI. The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation was not an inept organization, but despite J. 
Edgar Hoover's accolades, the Bureau was not cracking cases 
on its own. 
The era of Frederick Joubert Duquesne and Kurt Ludwig 
was the most successful for the Abwehr in America. 
Following the large-scale arrests of Abwehr spies in the 
summer of 1941, German espionage activities in the United 
States were sharply curtailed and the Abwehr was never again 
able to establish agents as firmly or acquire intelligence 
on the same scale. However, it has been clearly indicated 
that much of the intelligence gathered by Germany's spies in 
America came from relatively public sources, and 
additionally, after 1940, the FBI controlled Sebold and 
thereby controlled most of the intelligence information that 
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left the United States. The Abwehr agents made use of 
various technical journals, visually recorded shipping 
activities in the harbors and on the docks, and gathered 
verbal as well as written information concerning defense 
plants, military installations, and the war potential of the 
United States. True, Hermann Lang stole most of the 
blueprints of the Norden bombsight and Everett Roeder 
managed to obtain a great deal of technical data due to his 
position at the Sperry Gyroscope plant, but these 
individuals and their acquisitions were relatively unique. 
Most of the information gathered by the spies was readily 
available from the press and other sources which were open 
to practically anyone in the United States: but the 
significance of this knowledge was strongly dependent upon 
how it was interpreted. Thus the value the Germans put upon 
the intelligence from America was determined by the manner 
in which their intelligence agencies evaluated and made use 
of the material. 
It would be inaccurate, however, to state that 
Germany's espionage activities in the United States prior to 
Pearl Harbor were a complete failure. Information was 
received by the Abwehr from William Lonkowski, Ignatz 
Griebl, Frederick Duquesne, Hermann Lang, Everett Roeder, 
and Kurt Ludwig among others: information which the Abwehr 
passed on to the evaluating agencies of the OKW. However, 
after 1940, the FBI had control of much of the information 
sent out of the United States, particularly that which went 
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through Sebold. It is also interesting to note that many of 
these German evaluation agencies found that the agent's 
reports were probably the least valuable of their major 
sources, and were considered by some commanders to be far 
below radio reconnaissance, prisoner interrogation, and the 
press in comparable quality and accuracy. (25) Undoubtedly 
this was due to the Abwehr's lack of true examination of its 
agent's reports before they were sent in. This was most 
evident in intelligence information which came from Britain, 
all of which was in some way tampered with since all of the 
German spies in England were double-agents under the control 
of the British authorities. (26) 
Despite the publicity surrounding the arrests and 
trials of the Duquesne and Ludwig spy rings, the American 
public was unable to determine from available sources how 
effective German espionage in the United States actually 
was. Nevertheless, American citizens were kept aware of the 
real or imagined dangers espionage agents and saboteurs held 
for the United States. Some of the more sensation-seeking 
books and articles claimed for example, that the sinking of 
the merchantman "Robin Moor" in May, 1941, and the 
destruction by fire of the liner "Normandie" in February, 
1942, were due respectively to Nazi spy reports and 
sabotage. (27) 
Hollywood too, contributed to the public's concept of 
who the enemy spies were and what they were up to. A number 
of films were cranked out, among them "Confessions of a Nazi 
Spy," released in 1937, "Saboteur," and "Dawn Express," in 
1942, and "Watch on the Rhine," released in 1943. These 
films chronicled Hollywood's version of Nazi espionage and 
sabotage in America, and served to keep the spy image 
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larger than life by ascribing some rather outlandish 
behavior to the Nazi agents operating in the United States. 
The films were pure Hollywood camp, portraying a few 
stalwart Americans single-handedly defeating dozens of enemy 
spies. In the war according to Hollywood, it was often the 
amateur who apprehended enemy spies and saboteurs, while 
officials followed false leads. (28) But whatever the 
quality of its films, Hollywood was consistent in its 
portrayal of Nazism and its adherents as absolutely evil. 
Popular fiction also reinforced the view of the evil 
Nazi, often depicting arrogance and cruelty as common German 
characteristics. John Steinbeck's The Moon is Down, 
published in 1942, told the story of a Norwegian town taken 
over by the Nazis, and is a good example of the strain of 
anti-Nazi literature common in America at the time that 
pitted the courageous forces of good against wickedness. (29) 
In the months following Pearl Harbor the publicity 
generated by enemy spies had a strong effect on the American 
public, as evidenced by the unofficial help given the FBI by 
members of the populace. Americans were rightly warned 
about the serious effects indiscriminate talking about 
troops, ships, planes, production, fortifications, and even 
the weather could have on the war effort. But even these 
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righteous cautions served to instill feelings in the United 
States that spies could, and probably were, operating 
everywhere. No one really knew what information the enemy 
considered valuable, therefore anything could be construed 
as a military secret. 
However, the effort to be patriotic sometimes took a 
ludicrous turn, as when the FBI received letters from 
helpful Northwesterners telling how Japanese disguised as 
salmon were swimming up the Columbia River. (30) Federal 
agents were also advised by anxious citizens that German 
spies were communicating with each other through the water 
faucets. (31) Other stories investigated by the FBI included 
reports of landings by enemy parachutists, civilian fears 
that saboteurs were putting ground glass into food products, 
and finally that mysterious flashing lights were German 
spies signaling each other. (32) Examination by the FBI 
disproved each allegation, yet these stories confirm the 
fact that a state of anxiety generated by the presumed 
threats posed by enemy spies and saboteurs existed in the 
minds of many Americans. 
The average American was bombarded with factual and 
fictional information about Nazis and enemy agents from 
movies, books, magazines, and newspapers; nevertheless 
citizens were particularly admonished not to discuss or 
repeat anything true or untrue about spies or saboteurs 
operating in the United States. (33) It was believed that 
any loose discussion about the opposition's espionage 
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activity could serve as a means of spreading panic around 
the country. ( 34) 
Yet those same sources that claimed to be fighting the 
war against spies and saboteurs acted almost as a catalyst 
in furthering spy hysteria in America. Americans were 
advised that the German psyche allowed no mercy to be shown 
to the enemy. (35) It was further stated: 
Saboteurs and fifth columnists in this country 
will stop at nothing. Poisoned water supply 
systems, poisoned milk for babies, blasts of huge 
magnitude in schools and department stores and other 
panic centres[sic]; bombs planted in the homes of 
high government officials, chemical poisons 
unleashed against men in army and naval training 
centres[sic]; wholesale murders of key war 
production workers--all that is definitely on the 
German sabotage timetable. (36) 
As the United States geared up to join the war effort 
against Hitler, there was a strong current of emotion 
against the "Nazi terror," and a belief that the war would 
encourage German espionage agents to work to undermine and 
ultimately destroy the United States. It was impossible to 
know that by 1942, the Abwehr and the Third Reich had 
already played out their strongest cards. Adolf Hitler's 
attempt to quickly conquer the Soviet Union had already 
failed, and on December 11, 1941, Hitler ignored the lessons 
of history, underrated the power of America and declared war 
on the United States. The Reich that was to have endured 
for a thousand years was destined to fall much sooner. 




German spying in America was far from the omniscient, 
all-pervading activity that many believed in and feared. 
True, the arrests and trials of German spies in 1938, late 
1941, and early 1942 confirmed that spying had occurred in 
the United States, yet these facts were reinforced by a 
visual and written message to the American people that not 
only boosted a heartless and depraved image of the Nazi, but 
also suggested that these "treacherous" and "insidious" 
spies were everywhere, working to undermine the world's 
foremost democracy. Thus, for many Americans, truth was 
augmented by wild rumor, rumor fanned by apprehension, and 
what was believed took precedence over fact. 
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When the United States finally became involved in the 
war in December, 1941, following the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor and Germany's declaration of war, Abwehr I was 
virtually without any good American agents. The majority of 
spies under their control in the United States were taken 
out of action by the FBI in the summer of 1941. As a 
result, when Adolf Hitler began insisting in 1942 that a 
program of sabotage be instituted against the United States, 
Admiral Canaris and General Erwin von Lahousen, who headed 
the sabotage division of the Abwehr, decided that saboteurs 
from the Reich would have to be landed on America's 
shores. (1) 
The magnitude of the war to which they were officially 
committed increased the awareness of Americans to the 
dangers posed by enemy saboteurs. Americans were warned 
that much of Hitler's early successes were aided by the 
internal collapse of the countries he invaded and ultimately 
conquered, breakdowns which were precipitated by the actions 
of German fifth columnists and saboteurs. (2) Americans took 
much solace in the fact that their world was separated from 
that of their enemies by two oceans, yet there was a very 
real fear of sabotage and treachery from within as evidenced 
--1 
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by the way Americans and their leaders reacted to the highly 
visible Japanese-American section of the population. 
Germans living in the United States were spared the 
internment camps and the sort of prejudice directed against 
the Japanese; but Nazi Germany remained the power that 
excited the highest suspicions, and its purported control 
over its nationals abroad generated fear. The Specter of 
Sabotage, published in December, 1941, stated: 
The Nazis know the whereabouts of nearly all 
German nationals in the United States and past 
experience teaches us that Germany is the specialist 
among nations in the murderous business of sabotage 
and espionage. To the Nazis, therefore, goes the 
dubious distinction of heading the list of those 
from whom we have most to fear in any consideration 
of the threat of sabotage. (3) 
The Abwehr chose the candidates for a sabotage mission 
to the United States from the files of the "Deutsches 
Ausland-Institut." Lahousen wanted men who spoke English, 
had lived in America, and were familiar with American 
customs, and the "Ausland Institut" was a good place to look 
for individuals with these qualifications. A pre-Nazi 
organization formed in 1917, the "Ausland-Institut" had 
originally operated as a propaganda agency, but changed its 
function after World War I, when it began collecting 
information on other countries to help Germans find 
opportunities overseas. After Nazification, the "Ausland 
Institut" continued collecting information on foreign 
countries from German residents abroad. It also held 
extensive files on Germans who had lived abroad but had 
returned to Germany. The functions of the "Ausland 
Institut" under the Nazis confirmed that Germany had 
knowledge of, if not control over, many Germans living 
outside the Reich. 
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The man Lahousen appointed to recruit the would-be 
saboteurs was Lieutenant Walter Kappe, an officer of Abwehr 
II, the sabotage division. Kappe had lived in the United 
States from 1925 to 1937, had been active in pro-Nazi 
groups, and was instrumental in forming "Teutonia," the 
first national Nazi organization in America. (4) As the 
National Socialist party in Germany became more powerful, 
"Teutonia" became the Friends of the Hitler Movement, the 
Friends of the New Germany, and finally the German-American 
Bund. Kappe was named Press and Propaganda Chief of the 
organization in 1933, but apparently tried and failed to 
overthrow the American Fuhrer, Fritz Kuhn, and was thrown 
out of the group in 1937. (5) 
Upon returning to Germany, Kappe became propaganda 
director for a radio station in Berlin which broadcast to 
North and South America. When war came he served a short 
time in the army before being assigned to the Abwehr. 
Because Kappe himself had lived in the United States for a 
number of years, he worked with the files of the 
"Ausland-Institut," paying particular attention to those 
repatriated Germans who had also lived in the United States. 
Hostility between the United States and Germany had 
increased dramatically between 1939 and 1941, and naturally 
84 
the Nazis were interested in those individuals who had spent 
time in America and who were familiar with the country. 
After a long process of interviews and eliminations, 
Walter Kappe selected twelve men from the records of the 
"Ausland-Institut" for a sabotage mission to the United 
States. The codename for the project was "Pastorius," named 
after Daniel Pastorius, the leader of one of the first 
groups of immigrant Germans to land in the United States 
almost 260 years before. (6) 
Kappe arranged to have all twelve men transferred from 
their assorted posts in the army or in defense plants to the 
Abwehr's sabotage training school at Quentz Lake in 
Brandenburg. There they spoke only English and underwent 
three weeks of instruction on the various methods of 
destroying industrial targets in America. The men were 
educated in general chemistry, learned how to combine 
incendiary mixtures and how to ignite them. They studied 
different kinds of fuses, detonators, and primers, as well 
as electrical, mechanical, and chemical timing devices. (7) 
The men were tested under realistic conditions in finding 
their targets, deciding whether to use an explosive or an 
incendiary device, how much to use, and finally, escaping 
detection. Kappe and his men toured lock gates on rivers 
and canals, railroads, and a few of Germany's major aluminum 
and magnesium plants, including the I.G. Farben aluminum 
plants in Bitterfeld. The saboteurs were instructed about 
the vulnerability of these sites and were shown which key 
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points were most susceptible to damage. (8) 
The saboteurs were also drilled daily in their 
personal, albeit fictitious, biographies. If questioned, 
the saboteurs were to maintain they had never left America, 
and were given forged Selective Service cards and letters 
with American stamps and recent postmarks to carry. (9) In 
addition, the men were instructed in the making of invisible 
inks and the use of secret writing for communication through 
the regular mail. 
The three week training period served to weed out 
those who showed no aptitude for sabotage work. Kappe 
dismissed three of the original twelve, and divided the 
remaining nine into two groups. George John Dasch was 
appointed the leader of one group, Edward John Kerling the 
other. 
At thirty-nine, George Dasch was the oldest member of 
the sabotage group and had spent nineteen years in the 
United States--more than any of his companions. Dasch had 
been born in the Rhineland and had served Germany in the 
last year of the First World War. Like many of his 
countrymen, he found life in Germany hard after defeat in 
1918, and in October, 1922, entered America as a stowaway. 
(10) 
Dasch worked as a waiter and a dishwasher in 
restaurants and hotels around the country, and in 1927 
joined the United States Army Air Corps. After serving a 
little over a year, Dasch purchased his way out of the army 
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and received an honorable discharge and an "excellent" 
character rating. (11) He married an American woman shortly 
after leaving the army, and later filed a declaration of 
intention to become a citizen of the United States, but 
never filed the final citizenship papers. 
In 1941, Dasch left New York City for San Francisco, 
traveled by boat to Japan, and by railroad overland through 
Manchuria and Russia to Berlin, where he arrived on May 13, 
1941. Dasch was employed in Germany by the "Sonderdienst 
Seehaus," a radio monitoring service which operated under 
the combined auspices of the off ices of Goebbels and 
Ribbentrop. (12) Since the "Sonderdienst Seehaus" listened 
to foreign broadcasts, its employees had to know a foreign 
language well, be fairly up to date on the politics and 
customs of the country whose broadcasts they listened to, 
and be able to translate what they heard into German. 
Consequently the "Seehaus" preferred to hire Germans who had 
lived abroad. Dasch listened to American news broadcasts 
for approximately six months before he was approached by 
Walter Kappe as a prospective candidate for a sabotage 
mission to the United States. Dasch was placed under Kappe 
and transferred to Abwehr II in February, 1942. 
Edward Kerling was born in Wiesbaden, Germany in 1909, 
and became an early member of the Nazi Party in 1928. 
Kerling came to the United States on an immigrant quota visa 
and worked primarily as a chauffeur and a domestic servant. 
He married a German-born woman in America, and apparently 
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was active in the German-American Bund. (13) 
Shortly after the war in Europe began, Kerling and a 
few Bundist friends--including Hermann Neubauer who would 
later join Kerling on the sabotage mission to the United 
States--purchased a sailboat, the "Lekala," with the 
intention of returning to Germany to help its war effort. 
The yawl and its passengers were investigated by the Coast 
Guard, the FBI, and Immigration and Customs officials for 
possible violations of American law. Kerling was ordered to 
dispose of the boat, and shortly after its sale in June, 
1940, he departed for Germany on the SS "Exchordia."(14) 
Like Dasch, Kerling obtained employment as a translator of 
English-language radio broadcasts. He went from there to a 
position in the Propaganda Ministry in Berlin. (15) 
Kerling was approached by Kappe in March, 1942, and 
interviewed for what he was informed was a secret "military 
mission" in the United States. Kerling agreed to what he 
thought would be a commando raid carried out by soldiers in 
uniform. He was not apprised of the sabotage mission until 
he arrived at the training center in Brandenburg. (16) 
Dasch and his group of four were to land off the coast 
of Long Island, New York. His companions included: Ernest 
Peter Burger, Joseph Schmidt, Heinrich Heinck, and Richard 
Quirin. 
Apart from the two group leaders, Ernest Peter Burger 
was the most important member of the mission, for it was 
Burger whom Kappe appointed to set up a front to serve as a 
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communications center for the sabotage mission. Burger was 
also to maintain written, coded contact with Kappe and the 
Abwehr, since Walter Kappe himself planned to come to the 
United States and direct sabotage operations as soon as all 
the groups he intended to send over were stabilized. 
Burger was born in 1906 in Bavarian Germany, joined 
the Nazi party early, and marched with Hitler in the Munich 
Beer Hall Putsch of 1923. As a member of Hitler's 
brown-shirted "Sturmabteilung"--storm detachment--or SA, 
Burger fought in innumerable street battles. During 
peaceful interludes, he completed his technical education 
and worked as a machinist. In 1927, Burger came to the 
United States on an immigrant visa, found employment as a 
machinist, joined the National Guard, and became a 
naturalized citizen. (17) 
Burger returned to Germany after Hitler's appointment 
as Chancellor in 1933, and was attached to the staff of 
Ernst R5hm, head of the SA. Burger escaped the purge of the 
SA on June 30, 1934, and eventually found employment in the 
domestic propaganda branch of the Party. In March, 1940, 
Burger was arrested by the Gestapo and accused of falsifying 
government documents, apparently for critical remarks 
contained in a geopolitical report he wrote concerning the 
Gestapo's activities in Poland. He was released in July, 
1941, drafted as a private in the army, and was engaged in 
guarding British and Yugoslav prisoners-of-war when his name 
was discovered by Kappe in the files of the 
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"Ausland-Institut."(18) 
Heinrich Heinck and Richard Quirin were both born in 
Germany, and both had received training as machinists. In 
1927, the two men had come to the United States--Quirin 
legally as an immigrant, Heinck illegally after jumping 
ship. Heinck and Quirin joined the Bund and its storm troop 
division, the "Ordnungsdienst." In 1939, both men took 
advantage of Germany's offer to pay the expenses of those 
who wanted to return to the Reich. They finally met at the 
Volkswagen plant in Braunschweig where they were assigned to 
work. Heinck and Quirin were recruited for the sabotage 
mission by Walter Kappe who, representing the 
"Ausland-Institut," had lectured those employees at 
Braunschweig who had once lived in the United States. (19) 
Joseph Schmidt was the fifth member of group that was 
to land off of Long Island in America. He too, had been 
born in Germany, but left during the unsteady years of the 
Weimar Republic and had gone to Canada. There he had lived 
by hunting, trapping, and selling alcohol to the Indians. 
Schmidt expressed his desire to go off on his own to Canada 
and start forest fires, but Kappe vetoed the suggestion. 
Schmidt completed the training with his fellow-saboteurs and 
accompanied them on their final leave in Paris and to their 
departure point in Lorient, France. However, Schmidt found 
he had contracted gonorrhea during the Paris holiday, and 
Kappe would not let him on the close-quartered 
submarine. (20) With Schmidt's departure, the two groups 
were evenly matched at four each. 
Herbert Hans Haupt was the youngest member of the 
sabotage mission. A member of Kerling's company which 
included Hermann Neubauer and Werner Thiel, Haupt was born 
in 1919 in Stettin, Germany. Haupt came to the United 
States with his family when he was five, and became 
naturalized in 1930 when his father received citizenship. 
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In June, 1941, Haupt, accompanied by a friend, left the 
United States for Mexico to escape a pregnant girlfriend. 
When their money ran out, Haupt and Wolfgang Wergin accepted 
the help of the German Consulate which paid their fare to 
Japan on the pretext that there was employment for them 
there. Faced with work in a labor camp in Japan, Haupt and 
Wergin found working passage on a German freighter leaving 
for France, which arrived in Bordeaux on December 11, 1941, 
the day Germany declared war on the United States. Haupt 
was allowed to stay with his grandmother in Germany, but had 
to endure frequent questioning by the Gestapo, and the 
inability to acquire a work permit and find a job. (21) 
Haupt was contacted by Walter Kappe in early 1942 
about the possibility of an article Haupt might want to 
write about his trip to Germany. It was during the second 
interview that Kappe asked Haupt if he would be willing to 
return to the United States where " ••• certain unspecified 
duties might be expected of him •••• "(22) Haupt agreed and 
was sent to Quentz Lake where he learned of the sabotage 
mission. 
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Like their companions, Hermann Neubauer and Werner 
Thiel had been born in Germany and had come to the United 
States before Hitler came to power, hoping for opportunities 
that had not presented themselves in Germany. Neubauer 
arrived in America in 1931 and found work as a cook in 
restaurants, hotels, and on an occasional ocean liner. He 
became a member of the German-American Bund, and later 
joined the Nazi Party. He applied for his first citizenship 
papers but did not obtain final naturalization. (23) 
In 1939, Neubauer joined Edward Kerling on the boat 
"Lekala" in an attempt to sail to Germany. After this plan 
was foiled by the Coast Guard, Neubauer and his wife 
returned to Germany via Lisbon in July, 1940. Neubauer was 
drafted into the German army and served in the Polish 
campaign and in the first days of the war with Russia. He 
was wounded and while recuperating received a letter from 
Walter Kappe asking if he " ••. would be willing to go on a 
secret assignment to a foreign country where he had once 
lived."(24) Neubauer agreed and learned of the sabotage 
plans in Kappe's office. 
Werner Thiel was trained as a machinist and worked for 
the Ford plant and General Motors after coming to Detroit in 
1927. He filed a declaration of intent to become a citizen 
but made no further attempt to receive final naturalization. 
Thiel lost his job when the depression struck and was forced 
to travel around the country picking up what work he could. 
During this time he joined the Friends of the New Germany 
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and later the Bund. (25) 
Thiel returned to Germany in the spring of 1941, and 
met George Dasch during the crossing. He found employment 
in a war plant until March, 1942, when he was approached by 
both Kappe and Dasch about returning to the United States to 
do "something."(26) Thiel was informed of the nature of the 
mission discussed by Kappe and Dasch when he arrived at 
Quentz Lake. 
The equipment the two sabotage groups woul9 carry via 
submarine to the United States was packed in wooden crates 
lined with steel to insure against water damage. The crates 
contained explosives, some of which were designed to look 
like lumps of coal. Also included in the crates were 
fuses, detonators, timing devices, and pen and pencil sets 
which were actually incendiary bombs. (27) 
The men were also supplied with a quantity of American 
currency for expenses they were expected to accrue in the 
United States. Each group leader was given $50,000 as a 
general fund for buying sabotage materials, travel, bribes, 
and other group expenses. Each of the saboteurs was given 
$9,000, $5,000 of which was held by the group leader. In 
addition all of the men received $450 in small bills for 
immediate use in America. (28) However, some of the bills 
issued to the saboteurs had to be exchanged or discarded 
since they were gold certificates which had been withdrawn 
from circulation when America went off the gold standard in 
April, 1933. (29) All of the saboteurs were equipped with a 
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special money belt designed by George Dasch. 
While the group was to forego radio contact with the 
Abwehr in Germany, both Kerling and Dasch were given a white 
handkerchief on which was written in invisible ink the name 
and address of a mail drop in Lisbon through which they 
could communicate with Kappe. The handkerchiefs also had 
the names of two trustworthy people in the United States 
whom the saboteurs could call on for help. Kerling's 
information included the address of Dasch's brother in New 
York, and Dasch's that of Herbert Haupt's uncle in Chicago. 
The two leaders could communicate with each other through 
these mail drops until Burger had the communications center 
set up, and even after if circumstances warranted it. (30) 
' Before they were to depart, the eight saboteurs were 
informed of their sabotage objectives in the United States. 
Because aluminum and magnesium production was important to 
the American war effort, specific targets included three of 
the plants of the Aluminum Company of America at Alcoa, 
Tennessee, East St. Louis, Illinois and Massena, New York. 
The Philadelphia Salt Company's cryolite plant in 
Philadelphia was also slated as a target because it provided 
materials essential to the production of aluminum. (31) 
Vulnerable spots along the Chesapeake and Ohio 
railroad were to be damaged to disrupt the carrying of coal, 
as well as the Pennsylvania Railroad terminal in Newark, New 
Jersey, through which large quantities of war products and 
raw materials passed daily. Destruction of the Pennsylvania 
I 
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railroad's horseshoe curve at Altoona, Pennsylvania, and 
interference in rail transportation was stressed as an 
important step in crippling that state's anthracite coal 
industry. Other targets included: the Hell Gate Bridge over 
the East River in New York City; locks and canals on the 
Ohio River between Cincinnati and St. Louis; and the water 
reservoirs of New York City. (32) These were specific 
targets and did not represent all the mission's objectives. 
Aside from these goals, it was largely up to the group 
leaders what was to be sabotaged and when; however Kappe 
emphasized the importance of any acts of sabotage that would 
disrupt industry or damage transportation facilities and 
thus slow the passage of war materials. In addition, Kappe 
advocated a series of nuisance bombings in public spots 
around the country to undermine American morale. 
Following the weekend in Paris where Schmidt caught 
gonorrhea and the rest of the men got drunk, the remaining 
eight saboteurs, accompanied by Walter Kappe, travelled to 
the Lorient naval base which the Germans had occupied since 
June, 1940. On May 26, 1942, Kerling and his group left for 
Florida aboard the submarine U-584. Dasch and his group 
left two days later on the U-202. The two groups arrived in 
the United States in the early hours of June 17 and June 13, 
respectively. 
George Dasch and his companions landed on the beach at 
Amagansett Beach on Long Island. They wore German naval 
uniforms so they would be treated as prisoners of war and 
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not spies in case they were caught. Shortly after the four 
men and their crates of explosives had been landed on the 
beach, they were approached by a patrolling Coast Guardsman, 
twenty-one-year-old John Cullen. Dasch told Cullen that he 
and his friends were fishermen who had run aground. When 
Cullen invited them to spend the rest of the foggy night at 
the Coast Guard Station, Dasch refused, saying that they had 
neither identification papers nor a fishing permit. When 
Cullen insisted, Dasch threatened to kill him. After 
speaking of murder, Dasch abruptly changed tactics and 
offered Cullen a bribe to "forget what he had seen." Cullen 
accepted the money and was about to leave when Dasch gave 
him the name he would be operating under in America--"George 
John Davis"--and oddly enough, demanded that Cullen look 
closely at his face. After the patrolman left, Dasch and 
the other saboteurs buried their German uniforms and their 
trunks of explosives on the beach, walked to the train 
station at Amagansett, and rode the train to Manhattan. (33) 
Kerling's group landed without incident at Ponte 
Vedra, Florida, about seven miles south of Jacksonville. 
After burying their crates of explosives in the sand, they 
travelled by bus to Jacksonville where they separated. 
Herbert Haupt and Hermann Neubauer went to Chicago, Edward 
Kerling and Werner Thiel to New York City by way of 
Cincinnati. Both groups were to establish themselves 
securely before taking any action, and each group was to 
work separately--Kerling's primarily in New York and 
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Pennsylvania and Dasch's in the Midwest. Kerling and Dasch 
were to meet in Cincinnati on July 4 to compare progress 
reports and discuss sabotage plans. 
When John Cullen ran back to the Coast Guard Station 
at Amagansett in the early morning hours of June 13, 1942, 
it was to raise the alarm over his confrontation with the 
men on the beach, one of whom had threatened his life and 
then had given him money. Cullen returned to the beach 
about twenty minutes later with a group of Coast Guardsmen 
to search the area, but Dasch and his men were gone. The 
searchers could hear the diesel motor of the submarine and 
the smell of diesel oil was strong along the beach, but the 
U-boat was never clearly seen. (34) Until daylight, nothing 
suspicious was found except a package of German cigarettes. 
However, later in the morning, the searchers found the boxes 
of explosives and the German naval uniforms, which they 
turned over to the FBI. (35) 
Certain that the evidence they possessed signified an 
invasion attempt by Nazi saboteurs, federal agents 
questioned residents of the area as well as known Nazi 
sympathizers around Long Island in the hopes that someone 
could corroborate the description of Dasch supplied by 
Cullen. With little to go on aside from Cullen's testimony, 
the explosives, and the uniforms, it was a number of days 
before the Bureau could ascertain that the saboteurs had 
probably headed for New York City and the near anonymity of 




Though Dasch had been instructed by Walter Kappe to 
establish himself and his men in Chicago as soon as possible 
after arriving in the United States, he delayed moving his 
group, which upset Quirin and Heinck, both of whom disliked 
Dasch. Dasch reveled in his return to New York City and the 
power he derived from the money supplied by the Abwehr. 
However, unbeknownst to his companions, Dasch's plans for 
the sabotage mission were vastly different from those 
envisioned by Walter Kappe and the Abwehr. George Dasch had 
decided to betray Operation Pastorius; whether he decided 
this prior to his arrival in the United States or because he 
believed both he and the mission had been compromised by his 
encounter with Coast Guardsman Cullen, is uncertain. 
Whatever the reason, Dasch made his first telephone call to 
the FBI in the late afternoon of Sunday, June 14, little 
more than twenty-four hours after his arrival in 
America. (36) 
In his initial telephone conversation, Dasch 
identified himself as "Franz Daniel Pastorius," and stated 
that he had come from Germany to New York with information 
he would give only to J. Edgar Hoover. The agent he spoke 
to gave him little encouragement, thinking, no doubt, that 
it was one of the many crank calls directed to the FBI. 
Dasch stated that he would come to Washington later in the 
week and deliver his information personally. (37) 
Dasch had apprised only Peter Burger of his plans to 
wreck Pastorius, and gave Burger the option of either going 
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along with him or being arrested as a spy when Dasch gave 
everything away to the authorities. Because of the 
compatibility of Richard Quirin and Heinrich Heinck, Dasch 
and Burger had been thrown together as partners within the 
sabotage group; thus Dasch saw Burger as his only choice for 
an accomplice, someone who would back up the story he wanted 
to tell the FBI. Though Lieutenant Kappe had warned each of 
the saboteurs that death was the penalty for revealing 
either what they learned in Germany or the purpose of the 
sabotage mission, the power of the Abwehr to enforce their 
punishment was small beside that of the death penalty the 
United States government would almost certainly mete out to 
convicted saboteurs. Burger for his part must have sensed 
that his personal survival depended on his support of 
Dasch's betrayal, and thus agreed to play the role of the 
silent partner. 
Aside from a tense meeting on June 14, Dasch had 
avoided all contact with Quirin and Heinck, preferring to 
let Burger deal with the frustrations and security fears 
stemming from their stay in New York City. Free from the 
stress of maintaining the guise of one dedicated to the 
sabotage mission, Dasch enjoyed a thirty-six hour stint of 
two-handed pinochle before leaving for Washington, D.C. on 
the afternoon of June 18. (38) 
He made his second call to the FBI the following 
morning, identifying himself as "George Davis," the leader 
of eight saboteurs from Germany. By this time the FBI 
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offices had been informed of Cullen's report and the 
discovery of the crates of explosives. buried on the beach at 
Amagansett. Agents were sent to question Dasch. 
Dasch was placed in protective custody by the Bureau, 
and subjected to an intense period of interrogation. He not 
only exposed the men in his own group, but surprised the FBI 
with information about Kerling's group and their landing in 
Florida, about which the FBI had no prior knowledge or 
suspicion. A week after they had arrived in the United 
States, all four of the spies who landed on the beach at 
Amagansett were in the hands of the FBI. 
The arrest of Kerling's group took longer, primarily 
because Dasch was not certain of the time of the Florida 
landing, or where Kerling would send the members of his 
group. Dasch claimed to have forgotten that ammonia fumes 
would activate the invisible writing on the handkerchief 
that contained the names of Kerling's contacts in the United 
States, and the Bureau laboratory had to discover the key 
for themselves. (39) 
It was not until Tuesday, June 23, that federal agents 
were assigned to watch Helmut Leiner, a close friend of 
Kerling's, and as his name on the handkerchief revealed, one 
considered reliable enough by the Abwehr to serve as a 
source of help to their saboteurs. FBI agents followed 
Leiner from his home on Long Island to New York City where 
he met with Edward Kerling and Werner Thiel. Kerling was 
arrested that evening and Thiel two days later. 
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The FBI did not have to search long for Herbert Haupt. 
He came to the FBI office in Chicago on his own initiative 
on the morning of June 22, to explain his absence from the 
United States and to clarify his selective service status, 
about which the FBI had questioned his parents prior to his 
return to America. Haupt's cover included using his own 
name and maintaining that he had never left Mexico during 
the year he was away from America; unfortunately his 
well-rehearsed story was wasted on the the federal agent who 
listened to him. Dasch had already given Haupt's name to 
the FBI. 
Haupt was followed in the hope that he would lead to 
the last of the saboteurs, Hermann Neubauer, but the two 
never met. Haupt was finally arrested on Saturday, June 27, 
and it was only after his interrogation that the FBI was 
able to locate Neubauer. 
Throughout his days in the protective custody of the 
FBI, George Dasch had apparently envisioned himself a second 
William Sebold; a double agent working with the authorities, 
aiding in the arrests of enemy saboteurs, and ultimately 
receiving well-deserved accolades as an American hero. (40) 
Unfortunately for Dasch, the FBI and the Justice Department 
evidently did not believe the story of his deep-rooted 
antipathy toward the Nazis, or that he had planned from the 
beginning to betray the mission in the United States. 
Instead, as the prosecutor in the case suggested, they 
believed that Dasch had gotten "cold feet" when he was 
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observed on the beach at Amagansett by a member of the Coast 
Guard shore patrol. Dasch was arrested and charged along 
with his seven companions, all of whom were liable for the 
death penalty under America's wartime regulations. 
The arrests of the saboteurs were made public on the 
evening of June 27, 1942, by J. Edgar Hoover who assumed 
full credit for the FBI. Hoover played down the role of the 
Coast Guard, and made no mention of Dasch's confession. The 
report prepared by the FBI on the case, RE: GEORGE JOHN 
DASCH, with aliases, et al SABOTAGE, and released in 
November, 1942, did describe the actions taken by the Coast 
Guard at Amagansett Beach, but again contained nothing of 
the voluntary confession of George Dasch, which for all 
purposes, solved the case for the FBI. (41) 
However, at the time of the announcement the American 
public had little interest in the self-serving maneuvers of 
the Bureau, or in who or what had captured the German 
saboteurs. That they were in custody was enough for the 
majority of Americans, most of whom treated the news of the 
arrests as a victory of sorts--a triumph over the Nazi 
invaders. Public opinion was very obviously against the 
captured Germans, and demands for the death penalty were 
rife across the pages of newspapers and magazines. (42) The 
summer of 1942 was not a terribly successful time for 
America and its allies, with the Axis offensive in North 
Africa, the German advance in the Soviet Union, the almost 
constant bombardment of England, and the costly victory at 
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Midway. The capture of the German saboteurs gave Americans 
a badly needed win, and the nation wasted no pity on those 
who had sought to bring the war so much closer to home. 
The trial of the eight men began on July 8, 1942, in 
Washington, D.C. Although they had been captured as 
civilians, the saboteurs were tried by a military tribunal 
composed by President Roosevelt, under the rules of court 
martial for military personnel. It was the aim of the 
Justice and War Departments to subject these confessed 
agents of an enemy nation to the law of war; that being a 
secret military trial and a certain death verdict, neither 
of which could be guaranteed by the civil courts. The court 
that judged the eight saboteurs consisted of three major 
generals and three brigadier generals under the leadership 
of Major General Frank R. McCoy. The prosecution was led by 
Attorney General Francis Biddle and the Army's Judge 
Advocate General, Major General Myron Cramer. The defense 
counsel consisted of Colonel Cassius Dowell and Colonel 
Kenneth Royall, with Colonel Carl Ristine appointed as 
counsel for George Dasch, since Dasch was certain to testify 
against the others. 
All eight men were described in the official charges 
as being in "Violation of the Law of War," that is, that 
they acted on behalf of Germany to sabotage war materials 
and industries in the United States. The second charge was 
the "Violation of the Blst Article of War," which stated 
that the saboteurs had relieved or attempted to relieve 
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enemies of the United States, and had given intelligence to 
enemies of the United States. The third charge, "Violation 
of the 82nd Article of War," concerned spying, and accused 
the eight men of acting as spies for the German government. 
The fourth charge accused them of conspiracy to commit the 
first three crimes. (43) 
Because the United States was at war and because of 
the method and manner in which the trial was arranged and 
conducted, it was almost a foregone conclusion that the 
would-be saboteurs would be found guilty and receive the 
death penalty. Their confessions and the discovery of the 
crates of explosives brought from Germany to destroy and 
disrupt American war production--all documented by the 
press--certainly insured a wide-spread belief in their 
criminality days before the trial began. Nevertheless the 
defense counsels for both Dasch and the other seven 
defendants did their best to counter the charges levied by 
the prosecution. 
Colonel Ristine's defense of Dasch was based primarily 
on Dasch's voluntary confession and cooperation with the 
FBI. Colonels Royall and Dowell stressed the fact that 
their clients had committed no acts of sabotage and tried to 
establish that they had had no intention of carrying out the 
mission entrusted to them by the German Abwehr. Royall also 
questioned the validity of the military commission formed by 
President Roosevelt, which in essence suspended the writ of 
habeas corpus and denied the eight men a trial by civil 
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court. Royall maintained that the crimes with which the 
saboteurs were charged were covered by civil statutes, and 
thus the men were due a trial in civil court. That they 
were not so tried effected a challenge to both their civil 
rights and the American Constitution. 
Royall informed the President, the military 
commission, and the prosecution of his intention to apply 
for writs of habeas corpus and to test the legality of the 
military trial and the President's war powers in forming the 
military tribunal. Royall was well aware that his 
appointment had been made by the same authority that created 
the military commission, yet he felt he could not compromise 
in the defense of the Germans over a procedure which he felt 
was legally questionable. Royall wanted the President to 
grant either him and Dowell, or other individuals, the 
authority to pursue the matter as far as it could go. (44) 
The President was noncommittal. It was relayed via 
the President's secretary that Royall and Dowell would have 
to make their own decisions as to the scope of their 
authority. (45) Royall and Dowell responded: 
We ..• are of the opinion that we are authorized, 
and our duty requires us, first, to try to arrange 
for civil counsel to institute the proceedings 
necessary .•• and second, if such arrangements cannot 
be made, to institute such proceedings at the 
appropriate time. Unless ordered otherwise, we will 
act accordingly.(46) 
It was Royall's hope to convince the United States 
Supreme Court to convene in special session to receive 
requests for a writ of habeas corpus, which if granted, 
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would put the saboteurs under the jurisdiction of the civil 
courts. The foundation for Royall's request was in the 
Supreme Court decision of 1866 in "Ex parte Milligan," which 
ruled that a civilian could not be tried by a military 
commission unless martial law had been declared, or the 
civil courts were not in operation. (47) Milligan, a 
resident of Indiana during the Civil War, was accused of 
conspiring against the United States. His activities 
considered dangerous to the North were: inciting to 
insurrection; communicating with the enemy; giving aid and 
comfort to the enemy; conspiring to seize munitions of war 
and to free prisoners of war; and resisting the draft. 
Milligan was tried before a military court established under 
the authority of President Lincoln after he had suspended 
the writ of habeas corpus. Though convicted, Milligan was 
awarded a writ of habeas corpus by the Supreme Court and a 
trial in civil court. (48) In the Milligan case, the Supreme 
Court held that neither the President nor Congress had the 
power to set up military tribunals except in the actual 
theater of war where the civil courts were no longer 
functioning. (49) It was Royall's argument that American 
justice and legal rights applied to the German 
saboteurs--agents of an enemy in time of war--as much as to 
any American citizen. 
The court agreed to meet on July 29, and Royall made 
his formal application for writs of habeas corpus on July 28 
to the District Court in Washington, D.C., since the Supreme 
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Court would only hear the case on appeal from a lower court. 
Colonel Ristine did not feel that Dasch would benefit from 
an appeal to the Supreme Court and declined to join in the 
appeal, therefore escaping the adverse publicity and 
personal attacks visited upon Royall and Dowell. 
One letter to Royall implied threats of violence and 
suggested that Royall stay out of his home state of North 
Carolina after the war. (50) One woman wrote that the appeal 
to the Supreme Court on behalf of the saboteurs made a 
mockery of the United States, but added: "It is one way to 
kill Hitler. He must be dying of laughter right now."(51) 
A milder reprimand came from The New Republic, which 
stated: 
Even in wartime and even toward the enemy we do 
not abandon our basic protection of individual 
rights. Where should America show its greatest 
strength? In assuming every possible legal recourse 
to the enemy or striking at the heart of the enemy's 
power and destroying him? The legal tradition will 
not win the war for the United States. (52) 
The New York Times wrote: 
The decision to seek recourse in the Supreme Court 
did not meet popular approval in Washington. On the 
contrary there is great dissatisfaction here with 
the length to which the trial has already proceeded. 
Complainants recognize the duty of the Army Colonels 
to demand all possible rights for the saboteurs but 
none the less there was a feeling of disappointment 
that further steps would be taken on their behalf. 
On all sides hope was expressed that the Supreme 
Court would make short work of the move. (53) 
Royall also received positive reinforcement for his 
efforts to insure that the seven saboteurs received the 
justice he felt they deserved under the Constitution. His 
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desire to test the legality of the military trial and his 
efforts on behalf of his clients undoubtedly had much to do 
with the Court's decision to meet in special session. 
Royall's case was a test of the principles of American 
justice, and there was a great deal of interest among the 
justices and ordinary citizens as to how the case would be 
argued. 
In his case before the Supreme Court, Royall based his 
defense on the same argument as he had used before the 
military commission: that though they had the equipment to 
do so, the seven men committed no act of sabotage in the 
United States. He went on to stress that neither the coast 
of Long Island or Florida could be construed as a zone of 
military operations, and that only Congress had the right to 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and then only in case of 
rebellion or invasion. (54) Most important of all, Royall 
emphasized the precedent established in "Ex parte Milligan," 
which stated: 
Martial law cannot arise from a threatened 
invasion. The necessity must be actual and present; 
the invasion real, such as effectually closes the 
courts and deposes the civil administration. (55) 
For Royall's case to be successful, he had to convince 
the Supreme Court that the trial of the saboteurs was 
illegal under the Constitution, that the President of the 
United States had gone beyond his legal powers in forming 
the military commission, and that the crimes the men were 
charged with came under civil statutes. 
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Despite his ingenious defense, Royall was questioned 
by the Supreme Court and challenged by Attorney General 
Biddle over the definition of the location of a theater of 
wartime operations. Justice Frankfurter asked: "Cannot the 
enemy determine what the theater of operations is by being 
the aggressor?"(56) 
As prosecutor, Biddle maintained that the entire east 
coast of the United States was a theater of operations, and 
cited the sinking of merchant ships off the coast and the 
landing of the German saboteurs as proof. The fact that 
Nazi Germany and the United States were at war was 
conclusive enough for Biddle that the arrival of the 
saboteurs was an act of invasion and should be treated as 
such. "Ex parte Milligan" did not pertain to the case, 
according to Biddle, since Milligan, as opposed to the 
saboteurs, never wore an enemy uniform, nor was he a 
resident of a state in rebellion during the Civil War. 
For Biddle, the major issue before the Supreme Court 
was whether or not the President had acted legally in 
causing the eight Germans to be tried by a military court. 
He felt the President was perfectly within his rights as 
Commander-in-Chief to give up the eight men to a military 
trial, and cited as precedent a law passed by Congress in 
1798, which stated: 
Whenever there is a declared war and the President 
makes a public proclamation of the event, all 
natives, citizens, denizens or subjects of the 
hostile nation ••• shall be liable to be apprehended, 
restrained, secured and removed as alien 
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enemies. ( 5 7) 
Biddle felt the authority of the President included 
the power to bar these enemy aliens from the civil courts. 
In fact, Biddle indicated his belief that the Court should 
consider repealing that part of "Ex parte Milligan," which 
stated that military commissions could not be established 
for civilians unless martial law had been declared or the 
civil courts were not functioning. He felt the case 
interfered with " ..• the appropriate execution of orders of 
the Commander-in-Chief."(58) 
Biddle's concluding remarks accurately summed up his 
own feelings and the position of the administration: 
The United States and Nazi Germany are fighting a 
war to determine which of the two shall survive. 
This case is no more important than a small 
skirmish, but on an important front. It is part of 
the business of war. Military trial for the 
petitioners endangers no traditional civil liberty. 
These German soldiers have already been given rights 
which no American would receive in Germany, and now 
ask for Constitutional privileges which we do not 
allow our own soldiers. (59) 
The hearing before the Supreme Court lasted just two 
days. On Friday, July 31, the decision was read without the 
usual accompanying opinion which, in the interest of time, 
would come later. The Court unanimously decided that the 
crimes with which the saboteurs were charged were sufficient 
cause for the President to authorize their trial by military 
commission. (60) Therefore, President Roosevelt's military 
tribunal was legal under the Constitution, and the plea for 
writs of habeas corpus for the seven men were denied. 
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It was not until October 29, 1942, that the full 
opinion of "Ex parte Quirin" was released. In it the 
Supreme Court affirmed the right of the President to have 
appointed a military commission to try the saboteurs, 
because the eight men were examples of "unlawful combatants" 
as opposed to "lawful combatants." "Lawful combatants" 
would have worn uniforms and would have been held as 
prisoners-of-war. (61) Since the saboteurs had worn civilian 
clothes and had come "with hostile purpose"--that is with 
crates of explosives--across the battleground of the 
Atlantic and the boundaries of America, Royall's defense 
that the men had committed no act of sabotage was not 
accepted by the Court. (62) To the Court, the demeanor and 
furtive methods of the saboteurs bespoke their belligerence 
and guilt. 
After the Supreme Court's decision, there was little 
doubt as to what the outcome of the military trial would be. 
Yet, even through his closing statement, Royall continued to 
emphasize what he had throughout his defense: that the men 
had not committed any act of sabotage, and it was doubtful 
that they would have. For Kerling, Quirin, Thiel, Neubauer, 
and Heinck, Royall probably expected a guilty verdict, but 
hoped for a prison term. In the case of Herbert Haupt, 
Royall stressed Haupt's youth and the circumstances under 
which he had left the United States. Haupt had not 
purposefully left the United States for Germany, but had 
gone to Mexico after learning of his girlfriend's pregnancy. 
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Royall stated that working with Walter Kappe and the Abwehr 
was merely Haupt's way of getting back to America. (63) 
Peter Burger probably made the best impression of the 
eight at the trial due primarily to the manner in which he 
conducted himself and answered questions. Royall felt that 
Peter Burger deserved leniency because of his appearance as 
a witness for the prosecution. (64) The fact that he had 
been arrested by the Gestapo also struck a responsive chord 
with those before whom he testified because it made him 
appear to be a dissident of the Third Reich. Royall used 
the anti-Nazi attitude attributed to Burger as the reason 
behind Burger's desire to leave Germany in any way 
opportunity provided. 
Ristine's closing summary on the behalf of George 
Dasch reiterated Dasch's aid to the FBI and the part he 
played in the arrest of the other seven saboteurs. Ristine 
sought an acquittal on all the charges, and in a different 
year, Dasch might have received both the acquittal and the 
hero's accolades he felt he deserved. But in 1942, the 
appearance of eight German saboteurs in a nation at war 
decreed otherwise. In the era of the "total" war, the 
United States could not afford to be tolerant of its 
enemies, nor would the country allow it. Roosevelt's 
selection of the military commission, its method and secrecy 
were all part of a process to insure that all eight men 
received the death penalty. 
The trial ended on Saturday, August 1, and on Monday, 
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August 3, the military commission reached a verdict and 
reconvened to inform the prosecution, defense, and the 
prisoners, not what the verdict was, but only that one had 
been reached. This same style of secrecy had been 
maintained throughout the trial; in fact the trial 
transcript remained a classified government document until 
1960. It was up to President Roosevelt to consider the 
commission's recommendations and decide the final verdict. 
The defendants were not allowed the right of appeal. 
On Saturday, August 8, 1942, Edward Kerling, Heinrich 
Heinck, Richard Quirin, Werner Thiel, Herbert Haupt, and 
Hermann Neubauer were electrocuted in the Washington, D.C. 
jail. It was only after their death that the nation learned 
of the military commission's findings and President 
Roosevelt's verdict. All eight saboteurs were found guilty 
and sentenced to death. However, the commission recommended 
a commutation of sentence for George Dasch and Peter Burger 
because of their cooperation as government witnesses. 
Burger was sentenced to life imprisonment, and Dasch 
received thirty years. (65) 
After the executions, there were associated trials of 
those whom the government accused of helping the eight 
saboteurs. Herbert Haupt's parents and his aunt and uncle 
were tried for treason in Chicago, along with the parents of 
Wolfgang Wergin, the friend with whom Haupt had originally 
left the United States. Peter Burger testified against them 
as the government's major witness. All were found guilty, 
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the men sentenced to death, the women to twenty-five years 
and $10,000 fines. However, after appeals the women were 
found not guilty, Wergin and Freehling received five years, 
and Haupt was sentenced to life imprisonment and a $10,000 
fine. ( 6 6) 
In New York, Burger also testified against Anthony 
Cramer, to whom Thiel had given his money belt for safe 
keeping. Cramer was sentenced to forty-five years, but 
appealed all the way to the Supreme Court where the verdict 
was overruled. Cramer was finally sentenced to six years 
for trading with the enemy. Hermann Faje had taken Heinrich 
Heinck's money and received five years for trading with the 
enemy. Edward Kerling's girlfriend, Hedwig Engemann, and 
Helmut Leiner, whom Kerling had contacted as a reliable 
source of help, were both convicted of concealing their 
knowledge of the saboteurs in America. Engemann received 
three years and Leiner was sentenced to eighteen, but was 
paroled in 1954. (67) 
George Dasch and Peter Burger served only a fraction 
of their respective prison terms. In April, 1948, President 
Truman commuted their sentences and the two men were 
deported to Germany. (68) Presumably by 1948 the crimes for 
which Burger and Dasch had been convicted were not taken as 
seriously as they had been in 1942. Certainly immediately 
after the saboteurs were caught, public opinion raged 
against them, demanding death as the only fitting 
punishment. After the arrest of the eight saboteurs and the 
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execution of six of their number, sabotage in America became 
something to guard against with increasing vigilance. The 
public was warned that " .•• the Germans will try again--next 
time perhaps not by a landing on our coasts but by some new 
route!"(69) "Patriotic citizens" were encouraged to take 
"defensive counterespionage" measures in their speech and 
written communications and in the overall conduct of their 
daily lives to aid in the struggle against enemy agents. (70) 
But by this time, the United States was more prepared 
to battle the total war strategy practiced by the enemy. 
The Nazis were still consistently portrayed as brutal 
evildoers, but fifth columnists, saboteurs, and spies were 
acknowledged with less of a shock then they had been in the 
Abwehr's early days in America. And perhaps most 
importantly, in late 1942, the initiative was just beginning 
to pass to America and its allies. Americans were dealing 
with a more positive vein of war news following the 
execution of the six German agents and the internment of 
Dasch and Burger than they had when the arrests were first 
made public. But, if the United States and its allies had 
experienced severe and consistent losses throughout most of 
the war, it is probable that Dasch and Burger would either 
have been executed or would have stayed in prison much 
longer. 
By 1948, when Dasch and Burger were released, 
attitudes toward who the foe was had changed. The country 
was deeply involved in the Cold war and concerned over the 
l 
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containment of Soviet expansion. In 1942, the eight 
saboteurs had been "the enemy." In 1948, Burger and Dasch 
were merely extra baggage left over from an incident that 
had lost much of its significance; who were remembered only 
to be released, deported, and forgotten. 
The Abwehr learned of the dissolution of Operation 
Pastorius when J. Edgar Hoover announced the arrests of the 
eight German agents. General Lahousen, the head of the 
Abwehr's sabotage division wrote: 
•.• we have been receiving Reuter reports of 
American radio transmission announcing the arrest of 
all participants in Operation Pastorius, some in New 
York and some in Chicago. The reports give the 
correct location of the landings in the United 
States and of the targets for the planned sabotage 
operations. (71) 
The failure of Operation Pastorius, coming no more than a 
year after the Abwehr had suffered the humiliating Sebold 
affair, hurt the status of the Abwehr in Germany. The 
inefficiency of Admiral Canaris' intelligence organization 
had become more apparent, and it was clear it had blundered 
particularly in its choice of agents. 
In 1941, William Sebold had double-crossed the Abwehr 
and an entire network was uncovered by the FBI. Now a year 
later the Abwehr had been stung by treachery again, this 
time in the person of George Dasch, who ambitiously sought 
to emulate Sebold's actions. Unfortunately for Canaris and 
his service, the United States was not the only site of 
Abwehr failures. Within the Abwehr's files were a number of 
code-name missions which, like Pastorius, were unsuccessful. 
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Operation "Weisdorn" was to be an incitement of a popular 
uprising in South Africa; Operation "Tiger" the incitement 
of Afghanistan and Western India against the British; 
Operation "Shamyl" the instigation of an anti-Soviet revolt 
in the Caucasus--none of which proved triumphant for the 
Abwehr. (72) Instead, the miscarriage of these missions 
bespoke Abwehr incompetence and in the long run, a marked 
inability to get the job done right. 
Though the Abwehr's chief antagonist, Reinhard 
Heydrich, had been assassinated in Czechoslovakia and had 
died on June 4, 1942, both the Abwehr and Canaris had no 
lack of critics or enemies. The Abwehr had undergone severe 
cuts to its authority when, prior to Heydrich's death, he 
and Canaris signed an agreement which increased the powers 
of the RSHA at the expense of the Abwehr. In March, 1942, 
the RSHA took over all political intelligence services 
abroad and part of the Abwehr's counterespionage field. (73) 
In addition to this loss of power and its failures abroad, 
the Abwehr was unable to meet the general staff's demands 
for more information concerning the enemy's battle plans, 
especially in the Russian and North African campaigns. (74) 
Abwehr intelligence forwarded to the Foreign Armies Sections 
for final evaluation was often received critically. (75) 
Consequently the general staff evaluators believed they 
could do a better job than the Abwehr in gathering and 
appraising information pertaining to the enemy, and as a 
result began taking over some of the Abwehr's sources of 
~ 
information, among them the Abwehr's Main Post East, 
codenamed "Walli I."(76) 
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The Abwehr had other problems that hampered its 
attempt to stay afloat and functioning in the Third Reich. 
Before his death, Heydrich had indicated to Hitler and 
Himmler apparent ties the Abwehr seemed to have with the 
anti-Nazi resistance. (77) The Abwehr had played host to a 
number of opponents to the Nazi regime, providing them with 
an ideal cover. Among these were Hans Oster, head of the 
Abwehr's "Zentralgruppe," and Helmut Groscurth, the head of 
Abwehr II until 1939. Both of these men were part of the 
military's plan--headed by Chief of the General Staff Franz 
Halder--to overthrow Hitler during the Czechoslovakian 
crisis in 1938; a proposed coup to which Admiral Canaris was 
evidently receptive. (78) 
Though Canaris rededicated himself to the regime 
following Hitler's success at the Munich Conference, he 
joined in the planning of another "coup d'etat" in late 
1939. This coup was organized primarily to eliminate Hitler 
and thereby avoid mounting an offensive in the West, an 
attack which Canaris and others felt would sever important 
ties with Western Europe and bind Germany closer to 
Russia. (79) The circle had enlarged and included not only 
General Halder, but the man whom he had replaced, Ludwig 
Beck. aster's circle also included the ex-mayor of Leipzig, 
Carl Goedeler, and "Reichsgerichtsrat" Hans von Dohnanyi, a 
high official in the judiciary who manned desk "ZB"--Foreign 
Policy Reports--in aster's department, and maintained 
contact with the Christian resistance circles through his 
brother-in-law, Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer. (80) 
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The coup failed to materialize and the offensive 
against Western Europe took place. This aborted coup marked 
the end of Admiral Canaris' active participation with the 
resistance, though he was undoubtedly conscious of 
resistance plans and intrigue within the Oster circle. (81) 
By March of 1942, Oster was busy again with renewed plans 
for a "coup d'etat" along with retired General Beck and 
officers from Army Group Center in Russia, including Fabian 
von Schlabrendorff and Colonel Henning von Tresckow. This 
group fomented the tactical plan that the July 20, 1944, 
assassination attempt on Hitler was to follow. (82) 
The strong indications that the Abwehr was infested 
with "traitors" lent credence and power to those who would 
see the Abwehr dissolved or put under a different 
department. The specter of conspiracy in the Abwehr, 
coupled with what many saw as its declining effectiveness, 
simply added to already strong criticism against Canaris and 
his entire organization. If the Abwehr had to deal with the 
competition and intrigue instigated by its rivals, and the 
political dissension and lack of internal cohesion within 
its own ranks, how effective could their performance in the 
intelligence war have been? Put in this light, the vain 
attempt to install German saboteurs in America in June, 
1942, was a crucial failure to the Abwehr and its existence 
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under Admiral Canaris, and had a great deal of influence on 
future Abwehr actions in the United States. 
In his book, They Came To Kill, Eugene Rachlis said 
of Operation Pastorius: 
At the time it was conceived, the plan was logical 
in terms of the Nazis' military superiority in 
Europe. But not long after the failure of the 
saboteurs, Hitler and the German High Command had to 
contend with major defeats in Russia and Africa. It 
is not likely that any new plans from Abwehr II, 
even had they been suggested, would have received 
high priority. (83) 
Rachlis could have easily added that the Abwehr's 
institutional health and loyalty were so faulty and 
questionable that chances are, it could not have 
successfully mounted any sort of sabotage operation, nor 
would it have been asked. The controversial status of the 
Abwehr, following Operation Pastorius, had much to do with 
the subsequent lack of Abwehr-inspired offensives in 
America. Admiral Canaris and his organization never again 
mounted a sabotage operation of this size against the United 
States. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE FINAL REMNANT 
The collapse of the Abwehr's large spy networks in the 
summer of 1941 came at a time when the Abwehr was greatly in 
need of information from America. Just a few months after 
the arrest of the Ludwig and Duquesne rings, the Japanese 
attacked Pearl Harbor and the United States was propelled 
into what had become another World War. The number of 
Abwehr agents who had operated up through the summer of 1941 
was sharply reduced. The FBI had arrested large numbers of 
spies, and only a few escaped the net and continued to 
operate. Among these was Simon Emil Koedel, who weathered 
America's spy scares and worked for Germany from 1936 until 
1944. (1) 
Koedel was older than the majority of Abwehr spies, a 
few days short of his sixty-third birthday at the time of 
his arrest. Koedel was born in Bavaria in 1881 and came to 
the United States in 1904. He served in the United States 
Army from 1908 to 1911, and after his discharge became a 
naturalized American citizen. (2) 
Ladislas Farago, author of The Game of Foxes, called 
Koedel " ••. the best all-round spy the Abwehr had in the 
United States--in two world wars."(3) Farago wrote that 
Koedel began his spying in America when the First World War 
began by watching and reporting on ships and harbor 
activities. He went to England to collect military 
intelligence, but was arrested and deported back to the 
United States. Farago claimed Koedel "somehow" reached 
Germany, obtained the rank of Captain and worked in 
intelligence. When Hitler took over, Koedel joined his 
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" •.• new crop of intelligence officers," all the time holding 
on to his American citizenship. (4) 
The FBI report on Koedel agreed that he was involved 
in some sort of espionage work during World War I, but 
intimated that it was only in Britain and not the United 
States. According to the FBI report, Koedel had to have 
been back in the United States shortly after the war, since 
a three-year-old daughter was adopted in 1921 by Koedel and 
his American-born wife. The FBI also stated that Koedel 
became a motion picture projectionist and operated his own 
theater. In 1933, Koedel divorced his first wife and 
remarried. (5) The information from the Bureau seems to 
suggest that Koedel remained in the United States following 
his deportation from Great Britain. 
Sources agree however, that it was sometime in the 
middle thirties that Koedel volunteered his services to 
"Abwehrnebenstelle" Bremen to act as a spy against the 
United States. (6) Though Koedel had retained his American 
citizenship, he stated: "I love Germany with all my heart 
and I am even willing •.• to give my very life for her."(7) 
Koedel was trained by spymasters at the Bremen subpost and 
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returned to America as a "sleeper" agent. He established a 
residence in Manhattan, and on a monthly salary of $200 a 
month plus expenses, explored and consolidated intelligence 
resources he would use on behalf of the Abwehr. (8) 
To obtain intelligence in the United States, Koedel 
adopted a technique that appeared to be free from 
evasiveness and therefore was rarely questioned. Koedel 
applied for membership in the American Ordnance Association, 
a pro-defense organization comprised of armaments and 
munitions producers who maintained close ties to the War 
Department. Koedel enclosed his discharge papers and 
identified himself as a " .•. chemical engineer with large 
stock holdings in major defense industries ••.• "{9) He was 
accepted in the AOA and put on the War Department's 
confidential mailing list for all information regarding 
military supplies and production. As a member of the AOA, 
Koedel was given access to all meetings and lectures of the 
Association, and was allowed admittance to any defense plant 
in the United States. (10) 
Koedel used the stationery of the AOA to write letters 
to the chairmen and members of the Military and Naval 
Affairs committees in both houses of Congress, in which he 
called himself "an investor with considerable stake in the 
American defense industry," and asked for their help "in the 
interest of our nation's preparedness and security."(11) 
Senator Robert Reynolds of North Carolina, a member and 
later the chairman of the Senate's Military Affairs 
127 
committee, replied and invited Koedel to visit him in 
Washington. (12) Koedel was able to use this relationship to 
his advantage later in his career when he needed a 
highly-placed friend. 
After Germany's invasion of Poland, Koedel was 
activated as an operational agent of the Abwehr. He used 
his twenty-one-year-old adopted daughter, Marie, to help him 
spy on the New York harbor and its shipping. Koedel had his 
daughter spend time with sailors and merchant seamen on the 
docks and accompany them to waterfront bars, where she would 
attempt to gain information on convoys and cargoes leaving 
the United States. Marie's duties included a daily ride on 
the Staten Island ferry from which she could observe ships 
in the harbor and what they were loading or unloading. She 
also typed reports for Koedel which relayed the intelligence 
they had obtained to the Abwehr.(13) To augment what Marie 
discovered, Koedel sometimes dressed in the clothes of a 
longshoreman and visited docks along the waterfront to watch 
ships being loaded. The name and address of the 
manufacturer listed on the crates of supplies often gave 
Koedel the clues he needed to conclude what kinds of 
materials the ships were carrying. (14) 
Koedel preferred to let his daughter handle the 
waterfront while he occupied himself with the more 
interesting aspects of procuring intelligence. In December, 
1939, Koedel managed to gain entrance to the United States 
Army's Chemical Warfare Center at the Edgewood Arsenal in 
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Bel Air, Maryland. Twice in November, Koedel had tried to 
get into Edgewood by showing his AOA card, but was turned 
away. He finally telephoned the AOA in Washington, which 
called the War Department, which in turn called the Edgewood 
Arsenal. Koedel was given a guided tour on December 7, 
1939, a description of which he promptly sent to Bremen. (15) 
His report included as much technical data as he could 
assimilate, information on the storage facilities, and even 
names of the arsenal's suppliers. He also sent labels he 
peeled off boxes ready for shipment, one of which read: "25 
Hand Grenades--Irritant M 7--Fuse M 200--Gas."(16) 
Koedel had planned well when he first wrote to Senator 
Reynolds under the auspices of the AOA. In March of 1940, 
the German General Staff was planning its invasion of France 
and needed information on the French ports of Nantes and La 
Rochelle, particularly whether these ports could handle 
ships other than colliers and tankers. Koedel contacted 
Senator Reynolds and said he needed the information to 
arrange for supply shipments to France. Thanks to the 
Senator, Koedel was able to report to Bremen that, 
"according to the U.S. Maritime Commission, these ports are 
not limited in their facilities, but are capable of handling 
ships loading oil and coal, as well as general cargo."(17) 
As an additional favor, Senator Reynolds put Koedel on the 
list to receive a confidential report issued weekly by the 
Munitions Board of the State Department, which listed 
permits granted for the export of war material to Great 
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Britain. (18) 
Koedel made use of Senator Reynolds again in August, 
1940, when the Abwehr asked him to obtain the passenger list 
of the army transport, "American Legion," which had left 
Finland bound for New York. The transport had evidently 
made an unscheduled stop in Scotland, and the Abwehr wanted 
to find out what passengers boarded there. Koedel asked 
Reynolds, who wrote to the State Department and the War 
Department, and asked that his Military Affairs Committee 
receive the passenger list. The War Department would not 
release the list, but when Reynolds insisted, it was finally 
relinquished to him. It is not clear what Koedel told the 
Senator that resulted in Koedel's knowledge of the 
transport's passengers, but in December, 1940, Koedel was 
able to report to the Abwehr that the "American Legion" had 
picked up no passengers in Scotland. (19) 
Marie's success on the waterfront was used by Koedel 
to augment the information he sent to the Abwehr. Through 
the sailors and merchantmen she dated, Marie was able to 
provide Koedel with enough intelligence to write two reports 
for the German Navy. The first was entitled: "Report 
Concerning American Ships Inspected by England on Suspicion 
of Contraband." The second: "Report on the Conduct of Enemy 
Ships in Convoy at Sea in the Atlantic, Based on 
Conversations with British Seamen."(20) The second report 
was assembled with the help of Duncan Scott-Ford, a British 
sailor who had jumped ship in New York and was picked up by 
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Marie Koedel. Scott-Ford evidently volunteered himself as a 
spy for the Abwehr, and was highly recommended by Simon 
Koedel. This former British sailor went to work in Lisbon, 
where his knowledge of British convoy routes made him a 
welcome addition to the Abwehr's shipping expert in 
Portugal. Scott-Ford was hanged by the British in November, 
1942. (21) 
The reason Simon Koedel was able to operate for so 
long in the United States, and why he was able to escape the 
purge of Abwehr agents precipitated by the FBI plant, 
William Sebold, was singularly simple: Koedel did not use a 
radio to send his intelligence to Germany. Officers of the 
Bremen subpost had not allowed their agents to send 
intelligence through "Tramp." Thus Koedel was not involved 
with Sebold's radio or the communications center of Axel 
Wheeler-Hill, both of which were compromised because of 
Sebold's involvement with the FBI. 
For convoy and shipping intelligence that needed quick 
transfer to Germany, Koedel used the cable facilities and 
the Enigma coding machine of the German Consulate in New 
York. (22) All other intelligence obtained by Koedel went 
through the mail, and was thus subject to the scrutiny of 
British censors, who in the past, had uncovered Guenther 
Rumrich and Kurt Ludwig. To thwart the censors, Koedel made 
use of his AOA affiliations by using the same envelopes the 
War Department sent to AOA members. Apparently Koedel 
adapted these envelopes to send his intelligence to the 
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Abwehr via a mail drop in Milan, correctly assuming that the 
censors would not suspect the official-looking government 
envelopes. (23) 
The espionage career of Simon Koedel eventually came 
to an end. From 1935 to 1943, Koedel worked as a 
projectionist at the Lyric Theater in New York City. 
Evidently his co-workers entertained suspicions because of 
letters bearing foreign addresses Koedel brought with him to 
the projectionist's booth. Apparently Koedel received 
communications from Germany and from other Abwehr agents and 
hid them in an old stairway at the theater. Additional 
doubts about Koedel grew among his fellow employees when a 
section of film about a new airplane was cut from a 
newsreel. A search of the projectionist's booth revealed 
nothing. The missing film was later found by Koedel while 
working alone in the booth; a discovery the FBI thought 
" .•. made it appear that it had actually been in his 
possession."(24) 
In 1943, Koedel left New York for Harper's Ferry, 
Virginia, where he found work as a projectionist. It is not 
known whether his daughter continued her espionage 
activities on the New York waterfront, though chances are 
she did not. Koedel was reportedly a tough man to work for, 
in addition to being a stern father and a severe 
disciplinarian. He often hit Marie or beat her with his 
belt if he felt she was lazy or slow in performing her 
duties.(25) Koedel's attitude toward his daughter was not 
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one to induce love and affection, nor did it insure filial 
loyalty. Thus, unfortunately for Simon Koedel, Marie told 
all to a boyfriend who told a friend who eventually went to 
the FBI. Koedel was arrested on October 23, 1944, in 
Harper's Ferry. Marie was arrested later that same day. (26) 
Simon and Marie Koedel were indicted for conspiracy to 
violate the Peacetime Espionage Statute. Apparently the FBI 
accused them of spying for the enemy only from 1939 to 1941, 
either not knowing about or ignoring their activities in 
other years. Consequently, even though they were arrested 
in wartime, their espionage work came under peacetime 
regulations. (27) There was no threat of the death penalty 
for the Koedels, and Simon was not about to fill anyone in 
on what they had been doing since October, 1941, nor was he 
anxious for the FBI to find out about the more than six 
hundred messages he successfully sent to the Abwehr. (28) 
Thus, Koedel was quick to plead guilty after the trial began 
on February 7, 1945. Marie Koedel was found guilty by a 
jury on February 19. They were both sentenced on March 1, 
1945, Marie to seven years and six months and her father to 
fifteen years. (29) 
Though Koedel was arrested and sentenced to serve a 
prison term, he fared better than the Abwehr which had 
fostered and subsidized his espionage activity. The 
numerous failures attributed to the Abwehr were paraded 
before Hitler by his henchmen, and by late 1943, the 
Abwehr's incompetence was a common theme when Hitler 
discussed Canaris and his organization. (30) In January, 
1944, a series of events turned the tides of fate 
permanently against Admiral Canaris and the Abwehr. 
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On January 12, 1944, the members of an anti-Hitler 
group called the Solf circle were arrested by the Gestapo. 
Among those taken in was Major Otto Kiep of the Ausland 
branch of the Abwehr. (31) 
In late January, 1944, the German Army commanders were 
anxious about an Allied landing behind German lines and were 
particularly interested in what the Abwehr knew about enemy 
plans. When Admiral Canaris visited the headquarters of the 
Commander-in-Chief Southwest, on January 21, 1944, he stated 
that the Abwehr contemplated no Allied landing in the near 
future. Just hours later the Allies landed at Anzio, fifty 
miles behind German lines. (32) Needless to say, this did 
little to enhance the reputation of Canaris or the Abwehr. 
Finally on January 27, 1944, Dr. Erich Vermehren, a member 
of the "Abwehrstelle" in Istanbul, and his wife, defected to 
the British. (33) 
It was this last incident that broke the proverbial 
camel's back for Canaris and the Abwehr. On February 11, 
1944, Wilhelm Canaris was relieved as head of the Abwehr. 
The following day a directive was issued from the Fuhrer's 
headquarters which stated that a unified German intelligence 
service was to be formed under the command of Heinrich 
Himmler. As an independent organization, the Abwehr was 
finished. (34) 
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The head of Abwehr I, Colonel Georg Hansen, who had 
taken over from Piekenbrock in 1943, was put in charge of 
the Abwehr during reorganization. Canaris' name was taken 
off the active list and he was directed to Burg Lauenstein 
in Thuringia under what was essentially house arrest. 
However, by the end of June, 1944, Canaris was again made 
available for duty and Hitler appointed him head of the 
OKW's special staff for mercantile warfare and economic 
combat measures. (35) 
Canaris had little time to enjoy his new appointment. 
On July 20, 1944, Colonel Count Claus Schenk von 
Stauffenberg arrived at the Fuhrer's headquarters in East 
Prussia to attend the daily conference. The bomb he carried 
in his briefcase failed to kill Hitler, and nearly 5000 
people were executed and some 7000 arrested by the Gestapo 
as a result of the failed assassination attempt. (36) 
Canaris knew of the plot, but did not take part. He 
did not get along personally with Stauffenberg and 
disapproved of what he felt were the leftist leanings and 
amateur conduct of some Stauffenberg group members. For 
their part, the July 20 plotters found Canaris too 
conservative and of little importance to be actively 
involved or informed. (37) Canaris did not even know the 
date of the portended military coup. When he received the 
call on the afternoon of July 20, informing him of Hitler's 
supposed death, Canaris' first response was, "Dead? Good 
God, who did it--the Russians?"(38) However, Canaris was 
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arrested on July 23, after being implicated by Abwehr I's 
Colonel Hansen, who had actively conspired with Stauffenberg 
and others in the military coup. 
Further interrogations and confessions vaguely linked 
Canaris to the resistance, particularly to the Oster group. 
What tied Canaris inexorably to the anti-Nazis was the 
discovery of the Oster circle's papers on September 22, 
1944, which were hidden at the Abwehr's wartime headquarters 
at Camp Zeppelin in Zossen on the outskirts of Berlin. (39) 
These papers evidenced that the conspiracy against Hitler 
had begun long before the war; some of the material dated 
from as early as 1938, when a military coup was first 
contemplated. (40) The Zossen papers, indiscreetly preserved 
by Hans von Dohnanyi, were exposed by the Gestapo. This 
proved disastrous for a number of Abwehr and military 
officers who had contributed their ideas and names to the 
resistance against Hitler. The papers were the proof long 
sought by the Gestapo of Canaris' "treachery" and 
effectively sealed his fate. 
Thus by October, 1944, when Simon Koedel was arrested, 
the Abwehr he knew had been abolished. June 1, 1944, was 
the official date of dissolution for the Abwehr. Abwehr I 
and II were consolidated to form a separate Military 
Department--or "Amt Mil" in its abbreviated form--and 
transferred to the RSHA. Georg Hansen, the former head of 
Abwehr I, was placed in charge of "Amt Mil." After Hansen's 
arrest, SS General Walter Schellenberg who headed RSHA VI, 
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the Nazi Party's foreign intelligence organ, personally took 
over the direction of "Amt Mil." The Abwehr's posts and 
subposts within Germany, its occupied territories, and 
neutral countries were placed under control of the RSHA, as 
were its front line units. The Abwehr's budget and a number 
of its civilian and military personnel were also transferred 
to the RSHA. (41) 
Subsequent investigation of the July 20, 1944, 
assassination attempt implicated some of the more highly 
placed Abwehr officials. Canaris and Hansen were both 
arrested and executed. Hans Oster, the head of the Abwehr's 
Central Group, who had been relieved of his Abwehr command 
late in 1943 because of his ties to the resistance, and his 
friend Hans von Dohnanyi, the civilian lawyer who had 
occupied the desk next door, were arrested and executed. 
Colonel Wessel von Freytag-Loringhoven who took over command 
of Abwehr II from General Lahousen, and Colonel Werner 
Schrader, a member of the Abwehr's Special Duties Section 
and of the Oster Circle, committed suicide. (42) Many other 
individuals either directly or indirectly involved with the 
Abwehr were implicated in the assassination attempt, 
arrested, and executed. What was left of the Abwehr after 
its absorption into the RSHA was struck a severe blow. 
Ultimately all of Germany's intelligence functions were 
assigned to the uncoordinated, chaotic, and by then 
tottering Nazi party. 
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A LAST EFFORT 
There was a final episode of German espionage 
activity against the United States following the Abwehr's 
fall. This last mission was arranged under the auspices of 
the office of Walter Schellenberg, who directed RSHA VI and 
"Amt Mil"--the remnants of the Abwehr. In late 1944, RSHA 
VI landed two agents off the coast of Maine. Their job was 
to obtain technical and scientific data from the United 
States--anything that would aid Germany's deteriorating 
military condition. 
By 1944, Germany's war effort was in trouble. Its 
ally Italy had surrendered unconditionally on September 23, 
1943, following the Allied invasion of the Italian mainland. 
Italy had then joined the Allies as a co-belligerent, and a 
combined force of British and Americans was fighting its way 
up the Italian boot. In the east, the Soviets were on the 
offensive and were recapturing much of the territory they 
had lost earlier to the Germans. Germany was vitally in 
need of technical intelligence to help its faltering 
military situation, and Schellenberg knew the best place to 
acquire advanced data on ships, airplanes, rockets, 
engineering, and scientific discoveries was in America. The 
German agencies were receiving some information from the 
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United States and South America, but it was not enough and 
the delays were too long. (1) 
Apparently the first request for a mission to the 
United States had come to Schellenberg from Joachim von 
Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister. Ribbentrop wanted 
a source in the United States to gather and relay American 
political intelligence back to Germany, and also a source to 
judge the effect of German radio propaganda on the American 
public during the 1944 presidential campaign. (2) 
Schellenberg's priorities for the mission were different, 
but as an end result, both men wanted the same thing: the 
landing of an agent or agents in the United States, 
subsequent infiltration into American life, and finally the 
acquisition of a great deal of important intelligence for 
Germany. 
Schellenberg was ever aware of the abortive eight-man 
Abwehr mission to the United States in 1942, and sought to 
overcome the frailties inherent in an operation of this 
type, which he felt the Abwehr had overlooked or succumbed 
to. The choice of agents was a particularly important 
element; a decision that had to be made with the utmost care 
and consideration. This vital process was put in the hands 
of SS Major Theodor Paeffgen who directed Group D of RSHA VI 
and supervised spying in America. Paeffgen looked for 
candidates within the files of the Nazi Party's 
"Auslandsorganisation" or AO, the organization which united 
all party members abroad. (3) The "Auslandsorganisation" 
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also served as an information source about the countries in 
which various members lived, since each AO leader forwarded 
a monthly report concerning the economic, military, and 
political situation of his respective host country. (4) The 
two men finally selected were William Colepaugh and Erich 
Gimpel. 
Colepaugh was born in Niantic, Connecticut, in 1918. 
An American of American-born parents, Colepaugh's only tie 
to Germany came from his mother's immigrant parents. He 
attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology where he 
studied naval architecture and engineering before flunking 
out in early 1941. (5) 
After the war began in Europe, Colepaugh revealed a 
fascination with Nazi Germany and its methods of war that 
was, perhaps, not unusual for a young man of his age and 
interests. However, Colepaugh went further than necessary 
and began acquainting himself with German consulate 
officials in Boston, and the crew of the German tanker 
"Pauline Friedrich" that was tied up at Battery Wharf in 
Boston. 
In late May, 1940, Customs Guards stationed around 
Battery Wharf reported to the FBI that Colepaugh had made 
statements indicating an interest in going to Germany to 
study engineering, and also that he was unhappy in the 
United States and wished to leave the country. (6) When 
Colepaugh was asked why he wanted to spend time with Germans 
on a German ship, he replied that they were "nice" to him 
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and that he liked them better than people in the United 
States. (7) Because Colepaugh made many visits to the 
"Pauline Friedrich," invited crew members to his home in 
Niantic, and for a time lived and worked on board the 
tanker, the FBI initiated an investigation of him in June, 
1940. (8) 
While still at school, Colepaugh received a great deal 
of propaganda material from the German consul in Boston, 
Herbert Scholz, and from German news agencies in New York. 
In addition, he made a number of visits to the Boston 
Consulate in early 1941.(9) 
On May 7, 1941, Colepaugh went to Canada, shipped 
aboard the British freighter "Reynolds," and sailed for 
Scotland. Colepaugh had evidently been enlisted by Scholz 
to bring back information on British convoys, however by the 
time he returned, all German consulates in America had been 
closed. (10) In September, 1941, he shipped out of New York 
on the Swedish ship "Anita," which sailed for Rio de 
Janeiro. In Buenos Aires he was unable to get permission 
from authorities there to join the German army. (11) 
Back in America in July, 1942, a warrant was issued 
for Colepaugh's arrest for violating the Selective Training 
and Service Act. Colepaugh had failed to keep his draft 
board advised of his address, which was a violation of 
federal law and came under the jurisdiction of the FBI. (12) 
He was advised by the United States Attorney in Boston that 
he would not be prosecuted if he volunteered for military 
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service; consequently Colepaugh enlisted in the Navy. 
However, by June of 1943, the FBI was advised that Colepaugh 
had been honorably discharged "for the good of the service." 
Undoubtedly Colepaugh's pro-German sympathies had not been 
popular with his fellow apprentice seamen. (13) 
In January, 1944, Colepaugh obtained employment on the 
Swedish liner "Gripsholm," and dutifully informed his draft 
board. In Lisbon, Colepaugh jumped ship and went to the 
German consulate to find out if he could go to Germany. 
Colepaugh explained his relationship with the former German 
consul in Boston, his trip for Scholz to gather information 
on British convoys, and his desire to join the German army. 
A few days later Colepaugh was cleared to go to Germany. (14) 
RSHA VI was very interested in Colepaugh; the fact 
that he was American-born would make him almost undetectable 
as a spy in the United States. However, there was always 
the chance that, like Sebold, Colepaugh was a double agent 
working for the Americans. Schellenberg was determined to 
avoid the mistakes of the Abwehr, and had Paeffgen spend 
months checking Colepaugh's story, attitude, and actions. 
Finally after numerous interviews, Colepaugh was told he 
would be placed at the disposal of the Reich's Security 
Service, and was sent to the SD's spy school at The Hague in 
June, 1944. (15) 
The second selection for the RSHA VI mission to 
America was Erich Gimpel. Gimpel was born in Merseburg near 
Berlin in 1910. From 1935 to 1942 he worked in Lima, Peru, 
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for Telefunken, the German radio corporation. While in 
Lima, Gimpel was asked by a German attache to observe the 
ships and cargoes going in and out of port. When diplomatic 
relations between Peru and Germany were severed, Gimpel was 
interned as an enemy alien. He was repatriated to Germany 
by way of the United States, going first to Camp Kennedy in 
Texas and then to Jersey City, New Jersey. Gimpel sailed on 
the Swedish vessel "Drottningholm" and arrived back in 
Germany August 1, 1942. (16) 
After his return to Germany, Gimpel worked for a time 
designing radio transmitters. He also served as a courier 
for the Foreign Off ice between Berlin and Madrid, and 
because of his knowledge of Spanish, was put to work 
translating into German technical information from Spanish 
newspapers and magazines. This work brought him to the 
attention of RSHA VI, and in the summer of 1944, Gimpel was 
asked to go to the United States as a spy. (17) According to 
David Kahn, author of Hitler's Spies, Gimpel at first 
refused to spy on America, but was finally persuaded when 
the SS interviewer warned him that if Germany lost the war, 
Gimpel would be forced to go to the Soviet Union because of 
his technical abilities. (18) Gimpel was sent to the spy 
school at The Hague where he trained with William Colepaugh. 
The spy school at The Hague was similar to the Abwehr 
school which had operated outside of Brandenburg. There 
Gimpel and Colepaugh learned to handle explosives and 
firearms. Both received a great deal of physical fitness 
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training, and learned to ride a motorcycle. Political 
instruction was also included. Colepaugh was also trained 
in radio communication during his two month stay at the 
school. (19) Gimpel had much of the technical knowledge and 
training required and stayed only four weeks. 
After their training at The Hague, Gimpel and 
Colepaugh returned to Germany where they were educated in 
photography--how best to use their Leica cameras and how to 
develop and print the pictures they took. They also studied 
how to reduce their negatives to microdots that could be 
hidden on any letter or envelope, and read only under a 
microscope. (20) 
It was during the photography training that Colepaugh 
was told that he and Gimpel would be sent to the United 
States to gather information from American magazines, 
newspapers, books, and radio regarding airplanes, shipping, 
and rocket production. The two men were told to pay 
particular attention to anything in the engineering 
field. (21) Gimpel was instructed to build a radio by which 
all vital intelligence was to be sent to Germany. The code 
for sending radio messages was based on the advertising 
slogan on the Lucky Strike Cigarette package: "Lucky Strike 
Cigarettes--It's Toasted."(22) Mail drops in Lisbon and 
Madrid were to be used for the less essential material. In 
addition the men were provided with the names and 
whereabouts of twenty American prisoners-of-war in Germany. 
If Colepaugh or Gimpel needed to get in touch with Berlin, 
they were to address the letter to one of the prisoners, 
using invisible ink for the important message. These 
letters would be intercepted by German authorities and 
forwarded to RSHA VI. (23) 
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Both men were issued false papers, Colepaugh's in the 
name of "William c. Caldwell," and Gimpel's made out to 
"Edward George Green." Colepaugh received a birth 
certificate, a Selective Service registration card, a 
Selective Service classification card, discharge papers from 
the United States Navy, and a driver's license from 
Massachusetts. Gimpel's papers were substantially the same. 
They also received duplicate papers that they could fill out 
themselves if necessary. The mission was to last two years 
and some of the forms were predated for 1946. (24) 
Gimpel and Colepaugh were given $60,000 in American 
currency for their two year mission. Colepaugh had told the 
Germans that the cost of living in the United States had 
taken a "sharp turn upwards," and that a single man needed 
$15,000 a year to live on. (25) Gimpel was also given 
approximately one hundred small diamonds to be used if they 
ran out of money, or if the currency given to them was no 
longer in use. (26) 
Colepaugh and Gimpel left Kiel harbor on board the 
U-1230 in early October, 1944. They landed at Frenchman 
Bay, Maine, on November 29, 1944, and were in New York City 
by December 1, too late to make any judgements on the effect 
of German propaganda on the American presidential election. 
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Once in New York City, the two German agents looked for an 
apartment in a building that was constructed without steel, 
where they could operate their short-wave radio. A suitable 
headquarters was found by December 8, and radio parts were 
purchased for Gimpel to begin construction on a 
transmitter-receiver unit. The rest of the time they spent 
living it up in New York City on the RSHA's money. The 
Christmas season in New York provided a host of 
entertainments and neither of the two men seemed anxious to 
begin spying. (27) 
Though Schellenberg had tried to take every precaution 
in organizing his first espionage operation to the United 
States, there occurred events that were simply beyond his 
control. On December 3, the British freighter "Cornwallis" 
was torpedoed off of Bar Harbor, Maine, just a few miles 
away from Frenchman Bay. The FBI was alerted since this 
sinking signified the presence of an enemy submarine close 
to the Maine coast and the possibility that it may have 
landed enemy agents. (28) During the FBI interviews of area 
inhabitants, Harvard Hodgkins, the son of a Deputy Sheriff, 
reported seeing two men walking away from the beach in the 
vicinity of Frenchman Bay on November 29. Hodgkins had told 
his father about the two men, but their subsequent 
investigation of the road and the beach turned up 
nothing. (29) Another resident of the area had seen two men 
about a mile from where Hodgkins reported his sighting. The 
FBI found nothing on the beach but were able to determine 
that the two men did not ride the bus, make any long 
distance calls, or buy train tickets in the area. 
Unbeknownst to the FBI, Gimpel and Colepaugh had stumbled 
across a taxi and had hired it for the ride into Bangor, 
Maine. (30) 
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The sinking of the British ship and the warning it 
provided to the FBI was an incident Schellenberg could not 
have foreseen, but he was reasonably confident in Paeffgen's 
ability to predict the actions of the men the leader of 
Group D had recruited for the mission to the United States. 
Unfortunately for Paeffgen and Schellenberg, their mission 
experienced the same sort of failure as the Abwehr mission 
of 1942. The flaw was William Colepaugh. 
During the waging of the last German offensive of the 
war--the Battle of the Bulge--Colepaugh decided to walk out 
on Erich Gimpel, taking their cumulative cash with him. It 
is not clear why Colepaugh left, nor whether his intention 
was to turn himself in to the authorities. For whatever the 
reason, on December 21, Colepaugh left Gimpel at a men's 
clothing store, took the suitcase containing the money and 
his own traveling bag (both of which Gimpel had the keys 
for) to the baggage room at Grand Central Station. He 
checked in at the expensive St. Moritz Hotel on Central Park 
South for two days and continued to live it up in the city. 
On December 23, Colepaugh went to see Edmund Mulcahy, an old 
friend from school, and confessed his entire story, showing 
the false identification papers and the large amount of 
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money as proof. (31) Colepaugh and Mulcahy spent the next 
few days together and discussed informing the authorities. 
Finally on December 26, Mulcahy called the FBI and arranged 
for a special agent to come to his house and hear 
Colepaugh's story. Colepaugh was taken into custody and the 
hunt for Gimpel began. (32) 
Gimpel retrieved the suitcases Colepaugh left at Grand 
Central Station by first claiming he had lost the claim 
tickets and then producing the keys for the bags. Gimpel 
guessed correctly that Colepaugh would probably stay in New 
York and enjoy the night life before leaving the city, and 
would not want to carry around suitcases that he could not 
easily open. (33) 
Gimpel left the apartment he had shared with Colepaugh 
and moved twice to different hotels. In the meantime FBI 
agents were combing the city armed with an accurate 
description of Gimpel supplied by Colepaugh. Gimpel was 
picked up by agents of the FBI on December 30, 1944, at a 
newsstand in Times Square. (34) 
Erich Gimpel and William Colepaugh were charged with 
violation of the 82nd Article of War--spying--and 
conspiracy. Their trial by Military Commission began on 
February 6, 1945, at Governor's Island, New York. On 
February 14, the Commission found both men guilty and 
sentenced them to death by hanging. President Truman later 
commuted their sentences to life imprisonment. (35) 
When Gimpel and Colepaugh came ashore at Frenchman Bay 
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on November 29, 1944, they entered a country that was in 
profound contrast to Nazi Germany, a country whose 
inhabitants felt their war was all but won. In America 
there were no bombed-out cities, no real austerity, and 
nothing like the SS or Gestapo that dominated German life. 
True, rationing was a part of the war years in United 
States, but the country was well-off by German standards, 
and was reveling in the success of the war effort, of which 
the entire nation felt it shared a part. Though many 
experienced losses, the country as a whole celebrated the 
Allied push at Normandy in June, 1944, and the liberation of 
Rome and Paris in June and August. 
The Russians were racing through eastern Europe, and 
in October, 1944, captured Belgrade in Yugoslavia. The only 
surprise was the Battle of the Bulge in December, and 
American troops at Bastogne stopped this last German 
offensive. The war in the Pacific was also going well for 
the United States. New Guinea was conquered in September, 
1944. In the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October, the Japanese 
fleet was virtually wiped out by the U.S. Navy, and by 
February 23, 1945, the liberation of the Philippines was 
complete. 
Consequently, much of the fear that had been generated 
by the threat of German spies and saboteurs prior to the war 
was absent in the winter of 1944-45, though up through the 
war's end and even after, the American people retained the 
strongly reinforced image of the merciless, monocled 
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Prussian, and the diabolical, completely bad Nazi as a 
threat to the free world. Spy hysteria most assuredly waxed 
and waned in direct relation to America's conduct and 
success in the war, though by late 1944 Americans were no 
doubt more vigilant about enemy spies. A good example of 
this was the conduct of Harvard Hodgkins who spotted Gimpel 
and Colepaugh walking up from the beach in the early morning 
of November, 29. After passing the men on the highway he 
followed their footprints in the snow down to the shore, 
aware of the concern about spies landing on the coast. 
Later he was able to impart this information to the FBI. (36) 
In fact, shortly after the arrest of Gimpel and Colepaugh, 
J. Edgar Hoover recognized Hodgkins' action and stated: 
The only way that the agencies charged with the 
internal security of this country can cope with the 
problem is to ask for the cooperation of every loyal 
American in reporting any suspicious characters to 
the FBI. (37) 
The responsibility of coordinating the fight against 
enemy espionage rested with the FBI, and it is true that the 
Bureau worked hard correlating information against those 
reported to be disloyal to the United States, and searching 
out those "enemies of democracy." The Bureau's director was 
anxious that the FBI retain its paramount position as 
America's chief spy catcher. After the capture of Gimpel 
and Colepaugh, Hoover cautioned Americans to be ever on the 
alert: 
A great many persons have the idea that the war is 
over and that now we can let down the bars. This 
case and some other recent matters should dispel 
that idea. It is very clear that the German 
government is carrying on an intensive program of 
training espionage and sabotage agents and sending 
them into the Western Hemisphere. The German 
government at least, does not think the end of the 
war is near. (38) 
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However, by this last winter of the war, the danger of 
enemy infiltration seemed to have passed, or was at least 
more readily accepted and thus easier to handle and 
eliminate. The "salad" days enjoyed by the Abwehr's agents 
for a short time in the late 1930's were never to be 
repeated, probably due more to the quality of agents the 
German intelligence service recruited than to the vigilance 
of the FBI. It is certain that Nazi Germany underestimated 
the United States militarily and did itself great damage. 
It is easier to understand then, that the Third Reich's 
leaders possibly overestimated the capabilities and skill of 
the agents selected to work against the United States, and 
at the same time underrated the American security organs. 
Thus German agents sent to the United States after December, 
1941, were never able to gain a substantial footing. 
Schellenberg and Paeffgen had hoped to avoid the sort 
of disasters that had befallen the Abwehr's team of 
saboteurs in 1942, but they did not. Despite all of the 
intense checking the RSHA did on William Colepaugh and the 
precautions they took against his being a double agent, 
Colepaugh duplicated George Dasch's actions of 1942 and 
betrayed the operation to the FBI. Consequently the mission 
that had involved so much preparation, materials, and money 
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while the Third Reich struggled through the last months of 
the war in the end accomplished nothing. 
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In his final testament, Adolf Hitler wrote, "The war 
with America is a tragedy; illogical, devoid of fundamental 
reality."(1) Indeed, the entire German campaign against the 
United States was a tragedy--for the Third Reich. It 
reflected an almost nearsighted determination on the part of 
Adolf Hitler to ignore America as a world power, and the 
prospect and impact of American intervention on behalf of 
the Allies. Hitler disregarded the lessons of 1917, and 
through December, 1941, maintained his antagonistic attitude 
toward the United States, while appearing indifferent to 
America's power, its hostility to the Third Reich, and its 
growing attachment to the Allies. 
In 1941, Germany's war expanded from its fight against 
lonely Britain to the invasion of the Soviet Union, and 
finally to its declaration of war on the United States on 
December 11, 1941. The Third Reich went from an offensive 
war which it largely controlled, to tactics that pitted it 
against two of the largest and most powerful countries in 
the world. Hitler's ideology however, allowed him to 
maintain an unrealistic belief that Germany's purity and 
innate supremacy would ultimately triumph over the combined 
forces of his enemies. 
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Hitler alone was supreme in the Third Reich, 
controlling the state, the government, the party and the 
armed forces. His power was dictatorial, and he was 
extremely jealous of the authority he held. Power and 
influence in Nazi Germany was gained by seeking Hitler's 
favor, encouraging intrigue and rivalry between individuals 
and organizations. Intelligence work suffered from the 
competition for power generated between agencies. No agency 
or department had the full support of its peers. Hitler was 
the final arbiter in the use or disposal of material 
gathered by the intelligence groups. His view of America as 
being inconsequential to the war in Europe contributed to 
the inefficient espionage and sabotage campaigns in the 
United States. 
The Abwehr--Germany's military intelligence organ, and 
the off ice most involved in espionage against the United 
States--had to struggle for its very existence within 
Hitler's Germany. In addition, despite the fact that it was 
engaged in gathering intelligence from the United States 
from a relatively early time in the Third Reich's history, 
information obtained by the Abwehr did not influence Hitler, 
nor did his plans hinge on what the Abwehr learned. 
Hitler's designs for Germany were firmly founded in 
his own ideology, one of the main points being acquisition 
of land in Eastern Europe as a solution to the problem of 
German living space, or "Lebensraum." Hitler's foreign 
policy reflected an obsession with Eastern "Lebensraum," 
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observable in the annexation or "Anschluss" of Austria, the 
takeover of Czechoslovakia, the invasion of Poland, and of 
the Soviet Union. Each step he took was part of a 
calculated plan to expand the Reich eastward, often at the 
expense of all other considerations. Throughout the Reich's 
years of peace and the early years of war, Hitler's 
offensive policies proved successful. With these initial 
conquests following his schedule, Hitler felt foreign 
intelligence was superfluous, and had no need of the 
knowledge collected by his various espionage groups. As 
David Kahn, author of Hitler's Spies, said of the Fuhrer: 
"He intended to impose his will on other countries. Their 
fate would lie in his hands. For this he needed no 
intelligence."(2) 
Hitler disregarded or ignored any contradictions of 
his beliefs or interference in his plans. The Abwehr's work 
in America and the results produced did not, and would not 
have, dissuaded Hitler from his goals, nor would it have 
changed what he felt were his intuitive truths. Hitler 
claimed the United States was weak, calling it "a feeble 
country with a loud mouth."(3) He underestimated its 
military potential, and stressed American isolationism, 
social division, economic problems, and "racial decay" in 
order to discount a strong American role in Europe. In 
1938, Hitler replied to a question regarding the effect of 
American intervention in a European war with the statement 
that, the United States was incapable of conducting war. (4) 
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Hitler was convinced that America was an inferior country; 
an unrealistic belief, but one suited to his purpose. It 
left him free to deal with the problem of "Lebensraum" and 
the Reich's march east. 
Hitler's world was central Europe, and it cannot be 
emphasized enough that areas outside his world were 
essentially outside his scope of interest and concern. 
America was one of those nations that was of no vital 
importance to Hitler. That is not to say that the whole of 
Germany felt America was weak and of little consequence. On 
the contrary, German diplomats in the United States 
consistently warned the Reich's political leadership of 
American hostility toward Germany's domestic and foreign 
policies, while emphasizing America's industry, its 
potential military strength, and its close ties with 
Britain. However, these cautious truths made little 
impression on Hitler and those close to him. This failure 
on the part of Germany's leaders, particularly Adolf Hitler, 
to properly evaluate and use information from the United 
States hampered the German intelligence system. It is not 
unlikely then that these general beliefs held by the Fuhrer 
regarding the United States trickled down through the 
structure of the Third Reich and its people, including 
perhaps, its intelligence organizations. The Abwehr had to 
have been exposed to these arrogant distortions of Hitler's, 
and the RSHA certainly was. 
Naturally the Abwehr was interested in information 
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from the United States, but its methods and operations were 
often conducted in clear defiance of the American security 
system. In the spring of 1941, Hitler was spouting rhetoric 
that affirmed a German-American conflict would find Germany 
" •.• vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact that 
the German soldier naturally ranks high above the 
Americans."(5) In a similar vein, many Abwehr agents and 
their spymasters felt espionage activities in the United 
States could be conducted safely and with little 
interference from "those stupid Americans."(6) 
The accomplishments of Germany's agents in America did 
not live up to expectations of the spymasters in the Third 
Reich, nor did the information ferreted out by these agents 
affect the final outcome of the war. The Abwehr enjoyed 
some success in its early years in America, but by and large 
the Abwehr was forced to deal with a number of abortive and 
unsuccessful missions, and caused by agents who were 
singularly unequipped for intelligence work. When the Nazi 
Party in the form of the RSHA took over German foreign 
intelligence and worked against America the results were the 
same. 
Competition and rivalry between agencies within the 
Third Reich, the Abwehr's own internal problems and diverse 
loyalties, the fact that military intelligence was not at 
first a priority for the Third Reich's leaders, and the 
underestimation of the United States, made the Abwehr lax 
and sometimes caused distortions in its intelligence; thus 
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its espionage work in America suffered. This is clearly 
indicated by the caliber of a number of the agents engaged 
for espionage work against the United States: Guenther 
Rumrich, the consummate failure who joined the Abwehr via a 
letter and an ad in the New York Times, who was caught 
because of a foolish error and promptly informed on everyone 
he knew: George Dasch, the waiter selected for a sabotage 
mission, who betrayed his co-agents and their assignment in 
the hopes of becoming an American hero: William Colepaugh, 
the disgruntled American who thought it would be fun to spy 
for Germany, who energetically spent more than $400 a week 
of the RSHA's funds, and after less than a month in the 
United States, turned himself and his partner in to the 
FBI. (7) And finally, in the epitome of poor screening, the 
Abwehr's enlistment of William Sebold as a spy, whose 
clandestine work for the FBI coupled with the lack of 
security precautions on the part of the German agents 
working in the United States, led to the largest number of 
mass arrests of alien spies in American history. 
Obviously the choice of these men as agents was not 
successful for German intelligence in the long run: instead 
their selection proved self-defeating, for first the Abwehr 
and later the RSHA. Additionally, their performance did 
little to fit Hitler's much touted view of Aryan supremacy, 
or his belief in the unwavering loyalty and sense of duty 
imbued in those of German blood. Thus many of those 
enlisted by German intelligence for espionage work against 
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the United States were probably the least qualified, or the 
least likely, to serve as spies. 
From the beginning, National Socialist Germany and the 
United States were separated by a wide ideological gulf, and 
neither country's inhabitants were especially reticent about 
expressing their views about each other. Hitler, for 
example, was always very clear. To him the United States 
was: 
•.. a decayed country, with problems of race and 
social inequality, of no ideas ..•. My feelings 
against America are those of hatred and repugnance; 
half Judaized, half negrified with everything built 
on the dollar. (8) 
According to Hitler, Americans had "the brains of a hen," 
and the country itself was "a Jewish rubbish heap."(9) 
The Americans were equally blunt. Anti-Nazi 
demonstrations in the United States were mentioned regularly 
in dispatches from the German embassy in Washington to 
Berlin, beginning shortly after the installation of Hitler 
as Chancellor in January, 1933. By March, Ambassador 
Prittwitz reported on the already unfavorable reaction in the 
United States toward National Socialism. (10) Outbursts 
ranged from protests against German anti-Semitism to a mock 
murder trial of Hitler in New York City. (11) 
After 1938, most of America's hostility was directed 
toward what was viewed as Germany's aggressive foreign 
policy. In the United States, Germany was seen as the moral 
enemy, ideologically at odds with American principles, 
intent on ultimately conquering the world. This view was 
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reinforced by a number of America's governmental and 
political leaders. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau and 
Interior Secretary Harold Ickes were noted for their 
anti-German feelings and statements, and Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson and Secretary of Navy Frank Knox were avowed 
interventionists. (12) In 1940, President Roosevelt stated 
that Hitler and Germany aimed at "the complete domination of 
the world."(13) Secretary of State Cordell Hull described 
Hitler in late 1941 as: 
The most devastating and all-pervading conqueror 
and destroyer in the last thousand years and we 
believe there is no geographical limit whatsoever to 
his infamous plans. (14) 
These views, accompanied by a certain amount of effective 
exaggeration, were passed on through the media to the 
American public who, in general, came to share these same 
opinions. 
Almost from its inception as the reigning power in 
Germany, National Socialism was perceived by many Americans 
as a threat to the United States. Germany was the adhesive 
that bound the Axis together, ties which automatically put 
the anti-fascist countries of the world--the United States 
included--on the defensive. As the Third Reich maintained 
its aggressive policies, many Americans began to visualize a 
dividing line between themselves and the Nazis, which not 
only differentiated between their ideologies, but also 
emphasized what were seen as moral dif ferences--good and 
evil, freedom and slavery, democracy and fascism. It 
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naturally followed that Americans, for the most part, were 
adamantly against the importation of National Socialism to 
the United States, though the country had its share of 
pro-Nazi groups. High-visibility organizations like the 
German-American Bund, taken in the same context as 
statements by Hitler and others which stressed the 
international solidarity and innate loyalty to the Reich of 
those of German blood, violated American sensitivities 
toward foreign ties and contributed to the fear of fifth 
column activities. 
Though the United States had maintained a policy of 
isolationism after the First World War, Americans found that 
their self-imposed quarantine did not render their country 
inviolate from the activities of German espionage agents. 
The first arrests of Nazi spies in the United States in 1938 
illuminated this most clearly. Americans had determined 
that their country would remain apart from the problems of 
Europe and the rest of the world, but naturally the Abwehr 
did not recognize this position and showed no compunction in 
its attempts to delve into America's secrets. Thus the 
involvement of the Abwehr in America and its justifiable 
refusal to acknowledge American "isolationism," brought the 
United States closer in principle and position to other 
potential enemies of Germany, and accelerated America's 
progress away from its self-imposed segregation. 
The arrest of Guenther Rumrich in 1938 was the first 
outward manifestation of Nazi aggression directed toward the 
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United States. It was at this point that all the fears 
harbored by Americans for the Nazis seemed justified. The 
fact that espionage agents were sent to the United States 
seemed proof enough of the Third Reich's intentions. 
Suddenly Nazi spies seemed to be everywhere; sent to weaken 
America, to steal its secrets, to sabotage its industry, to 
topple the country from the inside. And their numbers were 
apparently enormous. For every spy arrested, Americans were 
told there were hundreds, even thousands more still at 
large. 
In 1941, the American public was again apprised of the 
presence of German espionage agents in their midst. This 
time more than forty individuals involved in two spy rings 
were arrested by the FBI. Fear of sabotage increased during 
the war years. In 1942 and 1944, in two different 
operations, the Nazis landed agents on America's eastern 
coast in an attempt to infiltrate spies and saboteurs into 
the population. Both missions were ultimately exposed from 
within. 
In each of the spy cases described, publicity and 
media coverage were very strong, exceeding by far the actual 
importance and success of the individuals involved. In the 
late 1930's and the early 1940's, the views of President 
Roosevelt's administration and the American public regarding 
German National Socialism were amplified through the media, 
and after the detection of the first German spies, publicity 
exaggerated the skills and numbers attributed to the network 
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of German espionage agents in the United States. This, in 
turn, led to unrealistic fears regarding German espionage in 
America, which translated into hysterical calls to the FBI 
describing German spies communicating through the water 
faucets, putting ground glass into food, parachuting into 
the hills, or sending cryptic messages all over the country 
by means of flashing lights. (15) 
The American public was swayed by their conceptions of 
the Nazis and what was believed to be the Nazi plan for the 
United States. While the spies arrested were often 
prejudiciously portrayed due to their "fascist" beliefs and 
their results belittled, there remained the fear among 
Americans of those German spies who had not yet been caught. 
These undetected agents were those who generated the most 
apprehension throughout the country. They were the ones who 
would start the fires, poison the water supplies, 
disseminate disease cultures and germs in populated areas, 
and blow up vital transportation centers. 
Unfortunately, most Americans were not informed of the 
ratio of success to failure for German spies and saboteurs 
in the United States between 1935 and 1945. Essentially, 
they knew only that agents of the Third Reich had been 
caught, and that each patriotic American had to be 
constantly on the defensive to guard against the insidious 
German spy. Of course this belief was strengthened by what 
the average American read and watched in films, and was 
mitigated slightly only in the last months of the war when 
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victory was in sight. 
The accomplishments of German espionage agents in 
America did not merit such fears; Americans themselves 
exaggerated the success and stature of the German spy, an 
image unfortunately reinforced somewhat by the media, and by 
the government. In the Third Reich, the value of gathered 
intelligence was determined by how the information was 
evaluated. Ironically enough, vital intelligence could be 
lost or disregarded if improperly judged. In the same vein, 
it could be said that what was perceived as the success of 
German spying in America was determined less by the concrete 
achievements of the agents than by how the entire espionage 
threat was evaluated by the American people. In the end, 
like Hitler, the Abwehr, and the RSHA, the American public 
became the victims of their own distortions and 
misconceptions. 
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